Newick Park, East Sussex

A History of the **Newick Park Initiative (NPI)** and its Contribution to Building Peace in South Africa 1986-1994

Jeremy Ive

Interim Report, July 2014

Jubilee Centre
BIBLICAL THINKING FOR PUBLIC LIFE

Table of Contents

Appendices

Author

Jeremy Ive is a Church of England incumbent in Kent who holds doctorates in Seventeenth English History from Cambridge University and in Christian Philosophy from King's College, London. He was born in South Africa and studied at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. He was involved in the peacebuilding programmes of the Newick Park Initiative in South Africa (1986-1991) and Rwanda (1994-1999) and with its successor organisation, the Relationships Foundation International in Sudan (1999-2002). The organisation is now Concordis International. He contributed chapters on 'Relationships in the Christian Tradition' and on 'International Relations and Defence' to the Jubilee Manifesto (IVP, 2005).

1. Introduction

It is often said that Christianity is the source of conflict. The Wars of Religion in the 17th Century laid the foundations for the scepticism of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, which in turn has tended to shape the largely secular outlook of contemporary Western Europe. Indeed, even today Christianity has been used as a rallying cry for conflicts.

However, at a deeper level, Christian faith can be a foundation for peace if not explicitly, at least implicitly. An example of this is the Newick Park Initiative on South Africa, which took place between 1986 and 1991. As Christians, this and every other instance can be seen as instances of God's providence and so is offered by way of encouragement. At the same time, as an example, it is possible to deduce from it some guidelines about how similar processes can be set up in other contexts and the principles which need to be govern their operation.

Before describing how this came about, let us consider how the process of transition in South Africa from apartheid to full democracy in 1994 came about.

2. Different Views of how Transition was achieved in South Africa

The recent death of Nelson Mandela has highlighted his personal role in the achievement of a peaceful tradition to full democracy in South Africa.

The policy of apartheid, that is, the entrenchment of white control by way of the legislative separation of the races in South Africa, had already led to the banning of the leading African political movement, the African National Congress (ANC), in the 1960s. As its leading figure, Nelson Mandela, was a political prisoner along with many others. By the 1980s, this policy had resulted in a groundswell of protest from the majority African community and other race groups (the mixed-race 'Coloureds', and the 'Indians' of South Asian descent).

The idea that there could be any form of dialogue about the transition to a fairer order, in which those of all races could have the vote, and the system of apartheid finally ended, seemed an impossible dream. Whites who attempted to engage in discussions with the ANC were vilified, and indeed were liable to prosecution. Blacks faced the invidious choice on the one hand of detention or even death, or, on the other hand, of denunciation by fellow blacks through their being considered and acted against as collaborators. The prospect was one of continually deepening racial conflict, without any real hope of a peaceful outcome.

There has been much focus on Mandela's personal initiative in bringing about the transition which took place with the transition to full democracy in 1994. Mandela's involvement from prison came to be facilitated by the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS), headed by its Director, Dr Neil Barnard. Slightly less attention (although also the subject of a feature film, *Endgame*) has been given to a parallel initiative initiated by the President of the ANC in exile, Olive Tambo, and pursued in secret by Thambo's deputy, Thabo Mbeki. It was also taken up (at first indirectly, and later directly) by Dr Barnard, with the knowledge and eventual involvement of President P W Botha, and was then taken up by President FW de Klerk with his announcement of the release of Mandela, the unbanning of the African National Congress and the other political movements in 1990. The release of Mandela began the negotiation phase which took shape in the form of the successive negotiation between the South African Government led by the National Party, and the recently banned African National Congress, leading eventually to transition to the introduction of the universal adult franchise in 1994.

The question which arises is was this transition:
    (a)   Dependent entirely on the charisma of Nelson Mandela and his generosity of spirit which made change possible?
    (b)   A cynical deal between the ANC and the white community – allowing the latter to retain their economic power within a continuing capitalist system while conceding the inevitability of black majority rule because of internal demographic realities combined with increasingly international isolation?
    (c)   A reneging by the ANC of their vision for the thorough state-orchestrated transformation of society, such as was enshrined in the Freedom Charter of 1955 –

the guiding document for the struggle (later the armed struggle) against Apartheid and white domination. Have the new black elite comprised on this original vision to feather their own nests at the expense of the still economically disadvantaged black majority?

Any of these three views, or a combination of them, may have contributed to the sense of disillusionment which seems to have set into the South African political scene. The question of the nature of transition is, thus, far from being a purely academic question, merely for the history books. Were those three views the only ones which can be taken of the nature of transition? Or, is there an alternative which can inspire a vision which:

(a)   Is not dependent on an individual, with all their personal strengths and weaknesses? This has been made all the more poignant by Mandela's death, since even though he stepped down from the presidency (a positive act in itself, where political leaders often cling on to power indefinitely), his physical condition had precluded him from direct involvement;

(b)   Is not merely a cover for a cynical black-white deal to ensure the survival of capitalism, with all its inequalities and gaps, albeit with an African face?

(c)   Does not yearn for a statist model, with all its proven failings such as in the former Soviet Union or Mao Zedong's China?

There were the two secret processes putting in place the conditions for negotiation between the South African government and ANC. These were the process of secret discussions between representatives of the SAG and Nelson Mandela on the one hand; and the process of discussions between senior members of the Afrikaner establishment and members of the ANC on the other, not least Thabo Mbeki, acting on the instructions and with the support of Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC in exile. Both these initiative were highly precarious. When Mandela drafted an eleven page document setting out the basis on which negotiation for the government could proceed, he received very negative response from members of the ANC, including his long-standing colleague, Govan Mbeki, recently released from imprisonment by the South African Government.

Separate from the secret process (although involving some of the same people), were the high-profile public meetings between senior members of the white establishment and members of the ANC – many of these organised and hosted by IDASA (the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa) founded in October 1986 by Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert and Dr Alex Boraine who had together resigned their seats in the South African Parliament in February 1986. Van Zyl Slabbert had also arranged a meeting in New York between Professor JP de Lange, the Chairman of the Broederbond with Thabo Mbeki of the ANC in May that year. Then, in July 1987, IDASA arranged a meeting between a delegation of leading Afrikaners with members of the ANC in Dakar in Senegal, concluding with a statement calling for a negotiated settlement of the SA question.

However, the 'deal' which brought about the settlement should not be seen in isolation or purely in any one of these terms.

3. Historical Background

In order to understand the nature of the conflict in South Africa, it is necessary to step back and look at the wider historical background behind the South African question, and how the impasse which developed in the 1980s.

(a)   The Settlement of the Land

The earliest settlers of South Africa were San hunter-gatherers who date back some 40,000 years. The Late Stone Age culture, the 'Wilton-Smithfield' complex, dates back to the tenth millennium B.C. About the time of Christ, closely-related Khoikhoi pastoralists migrated from the Tshu-Kwe area in central Botswana to the Western Cape. Bantu-speaking Early Iron Age settlements dating back to the third or fourth centuries A.D. have been found in the Transvaal and Natal. Although the limit to dominantly Bantu-speaking settlement appears to have coincided roughly with the 200mm summer rainfall limit, there is a possibility that Bantu-speaking pastoralists may have been present in the Western Cape during the first millennium.

Dutch speaking settlement in South Africa began with the refreshment station established in the Western Cape in 1652, and expanded beyond the wine and wheat-growing area with the movement eastwards of pastoralist 'trek-boers' up to the limits of Bantu-speaking dominance. In the process the San were killed or driven out of their hunting-lands and the Khoikhoi decimated by disease and reduced to subservience. The Dutch-speaking settlement was augmented in the Western Cape by slaves brought from other parts of Africa, Madagascar and the East Indies. Both the slaves and the surviving Khoikhoi were merged into those now categorized as 'Coloured.' The first substantial English-speaking settlement was on the eastern edge of the existing European settlement - notably the roughly 4,000 British settlers of 1820. A small English speaking settlement was also established in the predominantly Nguni-speaking area in Natal.

(b)   The 19th Century Struggle for Supremacy

Around the beginning of the 19th century, the Bantu-speaking area was devastated first by a severe ecological crisis and then by a series of devastating inter-racial conflicts: The Mfecane in the Nguni-speaking area in the east, and the Difagane in the Sotho-speaking Highveld. This resulted in the rise of two highly centralized Nguni-speaking states in the east: the Zulu and Swazi kingdoms, and a number of Sotho successor states in the Highveld. In the Transvaal area, the marauding Khumalo Ndebele in the south-west were matched chiefly by the Pedi Empire in the centre of that area. The Mfecane/Difagane offered an opportunity to Dutch-speaking farmers to move away from the British controlled Cape Colony onto the Highveld and then Natal where they secured military victories over the Khumalo Ndebele and the Zulu kingdoms respectively. The republic they established in Natal was cut short by the establishment of British authority there in 1842, but small republics were set up north and south of the Vaal River. The Orange Free State south of the Vaal was made possible by the defeat of the Khumalo Ndebele and agreements with the Sotho-speaking chiefdoms. The republics in the Transvaal existed in a precarious balance with the Pedi kingdom and the Sotho and Tswana kingdoms of the North and West and in alliance with the Swazis. In Natal, there was extensive British settlement, in the 1850s and Indian settlement, in the form first of indentured labourers and then of traders, from the 1860s.

The balance of power in South Africa shifted decisively in favour of the Europeans in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The power of the Xhosa confederacy to the east of the Cape Colony was broken by the cattle-killing of 1857, but what swung the balance decisively was increasing British interest in South Africa following the discovery of diamonds to the north east of the Cape Colony in 1867, and of alluvial gold in the Eastern Transvaal. The half-caste Griquas in that area were deprived of their lands and the diamond fields were eventually incorporated into the Cape Colony. British power was consolidated with the final subjugation of the Xhosa paramouncy in the war of 1877-8 and its incorporation into the Cape Colony in 1885. The defeat of the Pedi by the British and Swazi in 1879 followed the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877. Finally, the Zulu kingdom was defeated, dismembered and incorporated into the Natal colony following the Anglo-Zulu war of 1878-9 and the Zulu Civil War of 1883.

British power suffered a temporary setback after the defeat of a British army at the hands of the Transvalers in the war of 1879-80, and the discovery of gold on the Witwaters-rand in 1886. The British subjugated the Boer republics after a bloody and devastating war 189S-1902, and unified South Africa as a single dominion in 1910.

(c)   The Birth of Apartheid

Already, the, African held lands had been whittled away to reserved areas in the previously independent Bantu-speaking polities, and the peasant classes had been destroyed by the Glen Gray system in the Cape and the imposition of the poll tax in Natal; but these restrictions were consolidated by the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 respectively. These were accompanied by controls on Africans in industry, agriculture and the urban areas. Also in 1936 the last Africans were removed from the electoral roll. The electoral victory of the National Party in 1948 codified white rule into the policy of 'apartheid'. This involved the introduction of systematic restrictions on the lives of those not of predominantly European descent – including the removal of the 'Coloureds' from the electoral roll. Alongside the Land Acts and previous restrictions on Africans, 'Coloureds' and Indians a comprehensive system of racial separation culminating in the policy of 'separate development' according to which the reserved areas of the former Bantu-speaking kingdoms were designated the sole areas in which Africans should live and have political rights. Accordingly, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda were given their 'independence' during the 1960s and 1970s. Areas were also set aside for what were designated 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' although it remained unclear where they should exercise their political rights.

During the early years of town growth in South Africa, African settlement was not controlled. The general policy was to achieve segregation without compulsion by attracting people to segregated facilities, including barracks erected for male labourers. Regulations for the control of urban blacks were gradually introduced for a number of reasons; because of the obvious social, cultural and economic differences between whites and other races in the early twentieth century, to cushion the unfamiliarity of other races with European urban culture; to control and channel labour - a major reason for controls on movement to cities, as distinct from patterns of residence *within*

them; to deal with misfits and contain urban crime; and to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.[1]

As the need for a long-term presence both on the mines and in the towns became clear, white demands for segregation and control became stronger. Official attitudes to urban Africans were expressed in the oft-quoted dictum of the Stallard Commission (1922) that 'the native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister'. This doctrine strongly influenced legislation from 1923 onwards, until at least the late 1970s. It has had far-reaching implications for the provision of services, property ownership, participation in administration, and the morphology of African townships.

The supposed impermanence of Africans was reflected in the denial of freehold rights in terms of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Adoption of the Act by local authorities was optional, but by 1937 most locations had been registered. Local Authorities were empowered to set aside land for African occupation in locations, and to house Africans living in the town or require their employers to do so. Only exempted Africans could live outside the locations, although the general right to buy property outside locations remained until 1937. Restrictions were imposed on African peri-urban residence, but these were difficult to implement. Municipalities adopting the Act were required to keep separate native revenue accounts, and the revenue accruing from rents, fines and beer hall profits had to be spent on the welfare of the location. Few local authorities, however, were prepared to subsidise African housing from general revenue in the interwar years: thus the poorest sections of the urban population were expected to finance their own welfare, homes and services, a situation which did not change materially until the establishment of Regional Services Councils in the late 1980s.

The urban African population rose from 587,000 in 1921 to 1,150,000 in 1936 in response to industrial demands. Between 1942 and 1948, when industrialists began to stress the value of semi-skilled Africans in manufacturing, the Smuts government appeared slowly to be recognising the need for reform which was urged by several official voices as wartime industrial expansion increased labour demands. Smuts himself commented on influx control that 'You might as well try to sweep the ocean back with a broom', but his government nonetheless passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, which further restricted African rights in urban areas, notably through the notorious Section 10. The latter became mandatory for all local authorities in 1952, and remained in force until 1985 as the major instrument of influx control.

Further strong criticism of the migrant labour system and the pass laws by the Fagan Commission (1948) went unheeded. Instead, the '*swart gevaar' ('black danger')* scare was strengthened by the urban African Influx, and contributed to the Nationalist victory in 1948. The new government soon tightened up the 1945 legislation, partly in response to pressure from white farmers concerned about loss of African labour. The Illegal Squatting Act (1951) was aimed at peri-urban squatting by Africans seeking or already in employment in adjacent towns. More important was the Native Laws Amendment Act

---

[1] I owe this and the following six paragraphs to Johannes Wessels.

(1952), which laid the basis for all state intervention to control the distribution of labour between town and country, and between towns. This Act introduced the principle of 'efflux control' and the practice of canalising labour through bureaux in rural areas, from which permission to go to prescribed (mainly urban) areas had to be obtained.

Within the cities, Nationalist policy centred on the principle of 'group areas' as embodied in the Group Areas Act of 1950, as amended and consolidated in 1957 and 1966. These Acts produced distinctive 'apartheid cities' which are systematically planned and recognisably different from the 'segregation cities' which may be traced back to the origins of British colonial policy. Space in the apartheid city was very unequally distributed with whites enjoying the lowest residential densities in the most environmentally desirable and accessible sectors of the city. Townships for other groups, especially Africans, were peripherally located; hostels for migrant workers no longer adjoin the workplace but had been relocated within these townships. In some cases this had much increased commuter journeys, especially where townships are built beyond homeland borders, which has been the case wherever possible since 1967.

Meanwhile restrictions on African urbanisation led to the emergence of vast areas of squatter or 'spontaneous settlement', also beyond the homeland borders but within commuting distance of formal employment for those who could find it. This damming up of African population represented a spatial displacement of the urbanisation characteristic of most Third World Cities.

The flow of Africans to the 'white' urban areas, projected to be reversed in 1978, forced the National Party Government to reverse its doctrine that the 'Independent' and 'National' States should be the sole areas in which Africans might have political rights, although it remained unclear how these rights were to be exercised in the 'white' area and given a fully representative say in the central decision-making bodies of South Africa. The division of the land, and the exclusion of the Africans from the greater part of it, remained intact, as do many of the racially discriminatory clauses which remained of the doctrine of 'apartheid' (which had been renounced in principle by the National Party government).

(d)   The Growth of Black Resistance

African resistance to first the policy of segregation and then to the fully-fledged policy of apartheid of 1948 was then by the African National Congress, formed in 1912 in the eve of the passing of the 1913 Land Act, and the Pan Africanist Congress formed in 1959. The ANC adopted its clarion stance in the form of the Freedom Charter, adopted in a mass gathering at Kliptown in 1955. On 21 March 1960, the PAC organized a campaign against pass laws resulting in what became the Sharpeville Massacres National Party Government banned both the ANC and PAC on 8 April 1960. The PAC responded by founding its armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army and the ANC turned from peaceful residence to armed resistance, forming its military wing under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, subsequently tried and imprisonment. Both Mandela's final trial and his imprisonment become a symbol of African resistance to white rule and the policy of Apartheid. However with the economic boom of the 1960s, and the dominance of a powerful security apparatus and an effective military machine in the form of the South African Defence Force (SADF), white rule seemed to be secure. While

many English-speaking whites supported some form of power-sharing, the ruling Afrikaner establishment seemed secure in its control of politics and the public service, leaving control of the economic and financial sector, although with growing Afrikaner economic power, largely to the English-speakers.

The confidence of the Afrikaner establishment was seriously shaken by the explosion of rage which took place in Soweto in 1976 with mass protest by African schoolchildren against the teaching of Afrikaans, leading to several hundred deaths at the hands of indiscriminate shooting by the South African Police. In the inner sanctum of the Afrikaner Broederbond, this led to the realisation amongst the Afrikaner elite, although not yet the Afrikaner population as a whole, that they would need to 'adapt or die', and the election of the reformist intellectual, Gerrit Viljoen, as its Chairman. The death in custody of the Black Consciousness activist, Steve Biko, in 1977 further shook the white consciences (although it infamously left the then Minister of Police 'cold'). This was followed in 1978 by the 'Information Scandal' in 1978, leading to the fall of the police-focussed administration of BJ Vorster, and it supersession by the military-focussed, and more reformist, rule of PW Botha.

(e)   Failed White Attempts at Reform

In June 1982, guidelines were adopted by the federal congress of the National Party in Bloemfontein. The principle of a single composite legislature, as set out by the President's Council, was accepted; although it was stipulated that matters affecting a particular community would have to be passed by the chamber concerned, and matters of common concern would have to be passed by all three chambers, or, in the case of deadlock, by the President's Council. Standing legislative committees would ensure as far as possible that the legislation presented to the three chambers was coordinated, albeit in favour of one, i.e. the white, chamber. With respect to the executive, the guidelines rejected the proposal by the President's Council, that ministers should not be members of parliament, and so ensured that the Cabinet Ministers in question would remain responsible to the National Party as the majority party in the white chamber. The guidelines required, further, that the term of the executive president should be co-terminous with that of the parliament, and that he should be removable by the electoral college. In this way the caucus of the National Party would be guaranteed the final say in any political decision, since through the electoral college, it would able to appoint (and dismiss) the executive president, who, through the cabinet and President's Council respectively would have undisputed control over both the executive and legislative functions; and, through his appointment of judges, over the judicial function as well.

A new constitutional bill was introduced in the House of Assembly in May 1983. Despite the strongest possible opposition by both the Progressive Federal Party, on the one hand, and the Conservative Party on the other (for diametrically opposite reasons: the former on the grounds that it was based on the permanent exclusion of Africans from central government and entrenched the power, through an almost unlimited executive presidency, of the majority white party; the latter on the grounds that it would deprive the whites of exclusive political sovereignty), the bill was passed with a two-thirds majority, after a third reading debate, from 7-9 September, during the course of which the government reiterated the disclaimer, which Prime Minister Botha had already made to the National Party, of any 'hidden agenda' to bring Africans into the central government.

The constitution was presented to a referendum of the white electorate on 2 November, and received 1,360,223 affirmative votes to 691,557. Accordingly, elections to the newly-created 'coloured' House of Representatives and Indian House of Delegates were held respectively on 22 and 28 August (with just over 30% and 23% of all registered voters - with an estimated less than 60% of eligible voters registered in each case) The white House of Assembly was retained without re-election. The new constitution was proclaimed in the Government Gazette on 3 September, and the outgoing Prime Minister and leader of the National Party, Mr. P.W. Botha was elected by the resulting electoral college as the first executive president two days later. The first parliament under the new constitution met in January the following year.

The 1983 constitution made a number of concessions to minority parties, such as allowing them representation on joint committees and in the Presidents Council, but the hold of the majority white party was retained over the executive presidency through its automatic majority in the electoral college and over the legislative process as a whole. The principle underlying the 1983 constitution continued to be the distinction between 'own' and 'general' affairs, although definitional priority was given to 'own' affairs.

The 1983 constitution created houses in the central parliament for 'Coloureds' and Indians, although at the same time ensured that the white House of Assembly would at every point retain the decisive say in the election of a President and in legislation. The constitution entrenched the power of the white House of Assembly, along the lines set out in the second constitutional report of the President's Council, through the system of joint standing committees outlined there. In the normal course of events this would ensure that all three houses passed the same version of the bill in question. But where differences arose, the President's Council, in which the representatives of the majority party in the House of Assembly together with the President's appointees would have the automatic majority, would be empowered to rule on the matter, and its decision would become law on the approval of the State President. Thus, although, for example, the State President's powers, especially over such matters as financial bills, were not as extensive as in the second constitutional report of the President's Council, they effectively gave the State President, acting in conjunction with the House of Assembly virtually unlimited power to pass any bills defined by the State President as 'general', even if the other two houses were to reject them.

Soon after the institution of the new parliament, State President Botha announced on the 25 January 1985 that, despite his earlier disclaimers, Africans too must be recognized as possessing a common South African citizenship together with the other race groups. The natural corollary of this statement would be that Africans too should be admitted to the structures of central government. The nature of further planned reforms was further spelled out a year later by the State President in opening the parliamentary session of January 1986. The most significant change indicated was a willingness to consider the involvement of Africans in decision-making beyond the local government level. The 1983 constitution had continued to exclude Africans on the grounds that they were fully represented in the homelands and the Government repeatedly denied that there was any hidden agenda to include Africans in the structures of central government. In his January 1986 speech, however, the State President promised that legislation would be introduced to restore South African citizenship to those Africans resident outside the homelands, and to consider the involvement of Africans communities in the decision-making process, specifically within the Presidents Council and in a National Statutory Council.

(f)   The Conflict Deepens

By the 1980s, the policy of apartheid, the legislative separation of the races in South African entrenching white control, had resulted in a groundswell of protest from the majority African community and other race groups (the mixed-race 'Coloureds', and the 'Indians' of South Asian descent). The leading African political movement, the African National Congress (ANC), had been banned in the 1960s, with its leading figure, Nelson Mandela, a political prisoner along with many others.

Inside the country, the protest was led by a range of groups, many of them with a loose affiliation to the ANC. Outside the country, the ANC mission in exile, with the support of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the wider international community, continued to pursue the aim of forcing change through sanctions against the South African state. This was combined with sporadic guerrilla operations by the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, as well as APLA, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress. This operated from camps in the neighbouring states. The question was how there could be a peaceful transition to a just order with the two sides deeply entrenched: the white government with its highly organised security structures and powerful defence force seemed impermeable to any attempt to overthrow it.

Under the shorter First State of Emergency of 1985 and the much further-reaching Second State of Emergency declared in June 1986, the townships outside the 'white' areas, in which most African and other race lived, were kept under control through extensive operations of the army and police forces. Any idea that there could be any form of dialogue about the transition to a fairer order, in which those of all races could have the vote, and the system of apartheid finally ended, seemed an impossible dream. Whites who attempted to engage in discussions with the ANC were vilified, and indeed were liable to prosecution. Blacks faced the invidious choice either of detention or even death, or of vilification by fellow blacks and being considered and acted against as collaborators. The prospect was one of continually deepening racial conflict, without any real prospect of a peaceful outcome.

The re-imposition of the Second State of Emergency was accompanied by the extension of the Internal Security Act to allow up to 180 days detention at the sole discretion of a senior police officer. Units of the SADF had been deployed in the townships from the latter half of 1984 to reinforce the SAP, and more recently, forces of special municipal police have been raised in the townships to assist the black local authorities and the SAP to maintain control. Since July 1986, several thousand people have been detained, and although the number of people is now probably not much more than a thousand, these include a substantial proportion of the leadership of the UDF and similar organisations.

The effect on the leadership of the black community was devastating. Even those organisations which were not directly affected by detentions, notably the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the 'moderate' African municipal organisations, were disadvantageously affected by the detentions, since they were reluctant to be part of any political initiatives which might make them appear in the eyes of their communities to be unfairly taking advantage of their political rivals. Where attempts have been made to resolve disputes (as in the case of the current conflict between the ANC-supporting United Democratic Front (UDF) and the IFP in Pietermaritzburg), they have tended to be hampered repeatedly by the absence of those leaders who might have sufficient standing both to negotiate and to ensure that the resulting agreement was adhered to.

The same was true at a national level with the continued imprisonment of the internal ANC and PAC leaderships.

The Government argued that the imposition of the State of Emergency, not least through the restriction of any media coverage of the unrest, almost entirely reduced/the incidence of 'necklacing' and similar acts; although it has not removed the inter-communal violence in places such as Pietermaritzburg, or at Crossroads and KTC in the Western Cape. The prospect that white rule can be ended by a mass uprising of the black population had largely receded, but the potential for a violent conflict had not, and military power alone could not indefinitely contain African resentment at their continued exclusion from the exercise of political power. There could only be increasing bitterness and violence between those who collaborated or acquiesced in the Government's security apparatus, because of the benefits it offered in terms of social upliftment or personal advantage, and those who rejected it on the grounds that to go along with it in any way is to surrender indefinitely to the perpetuation and entrenchment of the white monopoly of power.

The shape of the Government's policies were, however, largely dependent on white attitudes to reform. The white election of May 1987 was a swing to the right, with the Conservative Party gaining ground and replacing the PFP as the official opposition. However, the major issue in the election was not the pace or character of the reform process, but the shape and effectiveness of the security structures which are increasingly seen to undergird it. In his speech at the opening of Parliament, the State President interpreted the election result as a mandate for the continuation of the evolutionary approach to reform. It remains to be seen to what extent the need to placate the white right wing will limit the reform process.

The only form of political government acceptable to the black majority was a directly- and proportionately-elected government on a common and universal roll. But the white community strongly opposed the immediate introduction of such a universal franchise, from which it is generally regarded that an ANC government would be elected, as a "recipe for chaos', if not a total surrender. As was amply demonstrated in the election of May 1987, the one issue which secured general white agreement was the desire to preserve their security. The ANC, with its close alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) was perceived to be the greatest threat to white security, and was held responsible not only for acts of political violence carried out by Umkonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) itself, but more generally for the unrest which resulted in the imposition of the State of Emergency.

The National Party Government was seemingly unable to grasp the nettle of moving toward any real sharing of power with the black community, and the question of a transition to fully-representative government has simply been rejected out of hand. But the question needed to be addressed if the current impasse, and deepening hostility between white and black (and within the white and black communities as well) was to be resolved.

Over and above the longstanding demands by blacks for political power, and the pressures by the international community in support of these demands, there is a growing acknowledgement among whites in South Africa that the present racial and economic inequalities and injustices need to be set right. However, there are differences

of view about what these are and what needs to be done. Although the gap between white and black wage-rates and per capita public spending has been reduced considerably, there is little sign that the racially differentiated governmental structures are to be opened out genuinely to full and equal participation by all sections of the population, irrespective of race. Nor is there any indication that the overwhelming white monopoly of political and economic power has been done away with. The South African Government has committed itself to reform, but its opponents charge it with a continuing desire to preserve white supremacy in just another form. The Government has failed to do away with fundamental instruments of racial discrimination such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act and differentiated health, welfare and educational provision.

The continuing State of Emergency created an atmosphere unsuitable for the facilitation of negotiation. Repression and turbulence have escalated dramatically during the last decade, particularly since the introduction of the tricameral parliament in the latter half of 1984. It has been estimated that over one thousand people died as a result of political violence in 1986 alone. In that same year, emergency detentions were estimated at over 25,000, with the majority of those imprisoned being schoolchildren, older students and teachers The argument of the South African Government is that tighter controls are needed to contain the conflict and prepare the ground for reform and negotiation, but repressive measures only serve to deepen the felt grievances of the black community.

The increased centralisation of power by the Government might potentially assist the process of decompression wherein a closed political system slowly makes steps towards becoming more open and free. The Government might argue that it needed to 'hold the ring' with its security establishment to create the necessary 'space' within which a political accommodation within the respective groups can be achieved. However, the danger, and more likely outcome is that it simply undermines black leadership, fragments the black community (between those prepared to work inside the 'ring' and those who are not — and those poised painfully in-between), and leaves the Government with the choice either of clinging on, with greater and greater difficulty, to its monopoly of power, or of eventually collapsing.

Faced with what they saw as de facto maintenance of white supremacy by the Government, black opposition groups within and outside of the country intensified their campaign of violent resistance, and this has been met, in return, by increasingly violent and authoritarian measures by the Government. The opposition of the major black groupings, including 'moderate' groupings such as Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha and Tom Boya's United Municipalities of South Africa (UMSA), to say nothing of the heavily restricted United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo), or the banned and exiled African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), will preclude the possibility of the Government's being able to deal with black leadership having the necessary stature to bring about a peaceful settlement of the present conflict.

4. Some Domestic and International Scenarios should Settlement not have been Reached

The cost of not working for a settlement in South Africa and simply increasing the level of the confrontation is set out below in the form of some domestic and international scenarios.

(a) Domestic Danger Scenarios

Three possible domestic scenarios might be envisaged, not mutually exclusive.

(i) Large—scale emigration leading to domestic economic collapse

This scenario might have occurred in one of two ways. First, as in the cases of Algeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, and Angola the white (and Asian) population might have left South Africa in the adverse circumstances in which they find themselves as a result of a violent or sudden transfer of power. The departure of African managers and professionals could not have been ruled out either, if there was a complete fall into anarchy and confusion. Although such a move might have been the result of fear, it could also have been made simply out of rational decisions concerning what the whites desire for occupational stability, for their children's' education, and for the future in general. On the other hand, an exodus might have taken place as the result of a policy initiated by the whites, such as that by the French in Guinea. Such a flood of emigration would not have been unprecedented in South Africa. Immediately after two recent instances of tension — the Soweto riots of 1976 and the crisis following the introduction of the new constitution in 1984 — the rate of white emigration doubled during each of the following years The then numbers of white emigrants were not necessarily significant in itself, but since a disproportionate number of those who left, or might have left would be in the managerial, professional, scientific and technical occupations, this would have constituted a severe blow to the economy. It had been estimated that perhaps over two million white South Africans might have had right of entry to the European Community under then rights of entry.

(ii) Seizure of power by an extremist group leading to genocide

The second scenario is that of extremism leading to genocide. A crisis situation such as that in South Africa would lend itself to autocratic rule in which extremist groups might seize power. A well-used, but pertinent example of this was Germany of the 1930's where the National Socialists (NSDAP) under Hitler came to power with the acquiescence and connivance of many non-NSDAP supporters who saw Hitler as the only strong force capable of restoring social and economic order, and resisting what they saw as the Communist threat from both within and outside of the country. Such a government might either, like Hitler, have come to power by quasi-constitutional means, or else by means of a putsch organised with the help of sympathetic elements in the security and defence structures. Once in power, such a government would have consolidated its grip on all aspects of life by the proscription of all other political groupings, and a restructuring of government and the economy through strong central control. The powerful military capacity presently at the disposal of the South African Government including a known military nuclear capability made such a possibility a danger of regional, and possibly international, dimensions; but the immediate danger

would have been the possible application of the powerful military means at its disposal against one or more sections of the population.

(iii) *Deepening civil conflict leading to heightened violence and repression*

Even if neither of the first *two* possible scenarios was precipitated, the then low-intensity guerrilla war, would, in all likelihood, have continued to escalate. As black expectations rose and were not realised, it is probable that acts of violence by the left and counter acts of violence by the right would have intensified. White populist movements such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) might well have given rise to organised white terror such as that carried out by the white Algerian Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) in reaction to the impending transfer of power by metropolitan France to the Algerian nationalist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) prior to Algerian independence in 1962. Such attacks would probably not have had any one target, and would also be aimed against others in the same community, against military and civil targets, and against the civilian population at large. The civil authorities would have reacted by violent repression and the further indefinite suspension of civil rights.

(b) International Danger Scenarios

Two possible international danger scenarios might also e envisaged.

(i) *Escalation of sanctions leading to regional economic collapse*

There was every likelihood that international pressures on South Africa in the form of sanctions by the United States, Japan and the EEC would have increased, especially in the light of the pressures which the United States would have increasingly applied on its partners through legislative and executive instruments. Legislation was currently under consideration by the US Congress which includes, among other things, a comprehensive trade ban and penalties on foreign companies with trading involvement in South This would have matched the measures which were already in place by the USA and other countries against South Africa, which included a ban on the importation of coal, steel, agricultural products, ceramics, textiles and Krugerrands, as well as the export of arms and security-related technology, and the banning of direct flights. Another target of international pressure was the re-scheduling of $7.5bn of South Africa's debt repayment (out of a total of some $20bn) which was due for renegotiation in mid-1990.

The most likely immediate effect within South Africa of increased sanctions would have been for the South African Government simply to increase repression and bolster the laager (the defensive arrangement used by the Afrikaner pioneers consisting of a hitching together of wagons in a circle within which they could beat off hostile attacks). There would unlikely to have been any overwhelming economic effect on South Africa in the short-term, since there would have been a continuing de facto trade with South Africa and the stimulation of a lucrative 'sanctions—busting' market (although South Africa has already suffered considerable losses in its exports to the United States this has been balanced by a rapidly increasing trade with Japan and other Far Eastern countries). Within South Africa, in the short-term, there might even have been a sanctions-induced boom as a result of local 'buy-outs' of overseas investments, and the stimulation of local manufacture .

The neighbouring states might also conceivably have benefitted in the short-term, since the resulting fall in the exchange-rate of the Rand would have eased their trade deficits with South Africa, and as South Africa became more dependent on neighbouring transport links for its 'sanctions-busting' operations.

In the longer term, however, the South African economy was, as has been pointed out, 'crucially-dependent' on foreign investment and technology for future growth. The long-term results of continuing sanctions were likely to be trade deficits, loss of jobs and stagnation or even decline in the gross domestic product – a potentially disastrous situation for a developing country with a rapidly growing population. South Africa would have lost her edge in international trade and the development of competitive technology, and the negative effects will be passed down sectors of the economy in the form of an endemic recession, with growing structural unemployment, decline of the manufacturing sector and the economic infrastructure'

As South Africa's economy failed to maintain growth, the effects would have been felt by its neighbours, who were still largely dependent on South African trade and enterprise. Southern African states were in large part dependent upon South Africa for imports, for energy such as oil and electricity, for providing a thoroughfare for port and rail traffic, and, in the cases of Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho, for the employment of large numbers of migrant workers. Thus, in the event of a collapse of the South African economy the economic and political structures of the entire region would have been in great danger. The whole region would have been sucked into the vortex of South Africa's economic crisis.

(ii)   Continuing regional conflict leading to endemic regional instability

Even if increased sanctions were not imposed, the then regional conflicts, presently intra-state, might well escalate or at least continue at a level similar to that at the present. South Africa then employed a regional policy which included clandestine raids into neighbouring territories, the support of dissident groups including the Resitencia National Mocambicana (Renamo) in Mozambique and the Uniao National para a Indepedencia Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola – the latter support combined with direct operations by the South African Defence Force (SADF)

The soon-to-be independent Namibia was ruled by the South West African People's Organisation, whose military wing which until shortly before that had been engaged in armed activities against the SADF were thus unlikely to be cordial, and the situation in the region would have remained much as before, except that South Africa would then have been spared the burdensome military expense which its occupation of Namibia and involvement in Angola had incurred.

Instability in the region would have continued to reflect the continuing conflict within South Africa itself. This would not only have undermined the prosperity of South Africa and its neighbours, but, given the high dependence on South Africa of its neighbours — particularly Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique, but also Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia – would have made the political and economic future of the region extremely uncertain, with political and economic disruption leading to endemic social instability.

(c)   Conclusion

Thus the danger of the impasse might have been considerable. It might have resulted in large-scale emigration leading to economic collapse, seizure of power by an extremist group with possible genocide or simply the deepening of the present civil conflict with heightened violence and repression — all this against the international background of the escalation of sanctions leading eventually to the economic collapse of the entire Southern African region; combined with continuing regional conflict leading to endemic regional instability.

For Christians, the question was how to respond in a way that was consistent with their basic commitment to Christ. However, in approaching this settlement, Christians in South Africa were deeply divided; and to some extent their divisions reflected the secular problematic.

5. Divided Christian Responses to Apartheid

According to the 1980 census, 76.6% of South Africans belonged to one or other Christian church. Divided among the different race groups, this figure broke down as: whites 91.8%, 'coloureds' 87.5%, African 74.1% and Asians 12.5%. The African population was divided among the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian churches but also the numerous (but largely politically quiescent) Zionist Christian Church and other similar denominations which drew on African beliefs. In the white population, the strongest Christian commitment was among the Afrikaners, who were divided among the Reformed denominations: the Nededuitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), the Gereformeerd Kerk (GK) and the Hervormde Kerk (HK), with a strong Pentecostal element as well.

Churches in South Africa were marked by great divisions, not least between those who wish to support or maintain the status quo and those who wish to change the existing injustices according to their Christian understanding. Others tried to leave the political arena entirely. Many churches, not least the influential Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), themselves became a battleground between those who seek to end racial divisions and those who seek to maintain them. The NGK was experiencing a state of inner disruption following the adoption of its *Church and Society* report, which condemns racism in contrast to 'wholesome love for one's people',[2] as factions split both within and away from the church, mirroring the divisions between supporters of the National Party and the Conservative Party.

The Testimony of Vereniging was made after a meeting of the 'sister' Dutch Reformed Churches in March 1989 and called for an end to all apartheid provisions and the end to the present restrictions on black opposition groups. The representatives of the white NGK expressed sympathy and unity with the position of their colleagues, but were unable to sign the declaration.[3] The feeling among the white DRC leadership was that rejection of the system of apartheid should not be seen as rejection of the freedom to develop and preserve distinctive cultures.[4]

Although the DRC accepted that, 'at the very last possibility', nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience cannot ethically be rejected as untenable; yet, because in practice these tend to lead to violence (which it entirely rules out as ethically tenable), it refused to support the practice of such methods. The DRC adamantly rejected boycotts, sanctions, and disinvestment because they are not 'orderly methods' of bringing about reform.[5]

Even among those who wanted to take a much more fundamental oppositional stance with respect to the status quo in South Africa, there were differences of approach and emphasis. Some, notably those involved in the National Initiative for Reconciliation (NIR) and Koinonia worked for reconciliation and a change of heart among individuals and communities. The NIR followed on from a meeting in Pietermaritzburg in

---

[2] 'Church and Society: a testimony of the Dutch Reformed Church as adopted by the General Synod ...', 1987.

[3] *Die Burger*, 23 May 1989, quoted in *Focus on South Africa*, 24 June 1989.

[4] Beeld, 17 March 1989.

[5] *Church and Society*, p. 50.

September 1985. Koinonia was led by Dr Nico Smith, an Afrikaans minister serving in the DRC in Africa congregation in Mamelodi, an African township near to Pretoria. Like the NIR, Koinonia sought to build up links across the racial divide, such as in the case of the 'Mamelodi Encounter', co-sponsored by the NIR and Koinonia March 1988. The NIR and Koinonia both rejected 'cheap reconciliation', i.e. the idea that relationships can be restored without repentance and real change; but it emphasized that reconciliation must be a central element in bringing about real and lasting social change.[6]

Others emphasised the priority of confrontation with the status quo, notably the signatories to the Kairos Document, first published in 1985.[7] They believe that even if individuals are converted, a radical societal transformation cannot take place because the government is seen as irredeemable. The only means of establishing true justice in South Africa, according to the Kairos Document, was to take sides with those political groupings working for the overthrow of the present government. Their aim was not to encourage individual change of heart, but to offer instead an alternative theological model to directly confront those in power so that the political, economic, and social institutions of South Africa will be radically transformed.

In the face of the sheer arbitrariness of the South African Security State, and the growing terror of right-wing death squads,[8] the response of some Kairos theologians tended to a thoroughgoing despair about the usefulness of any moral categories. The 'struggle' and the winning of power can become seen almost as an end in itself. The Kairos Document demanded that believers transform their churches' activities and litany so that they might encourage solidarity in the 'struggle'.[9] This concept of 'struggle' needs to be qualified carefully, since as Albert Nolan, a leading theologian of 'struggle' in South Africa pointed out, 'struggle' is not necessarily characterised by violence, rather it is a solidarity of total commitment with those who oppose the 'system'.[10]

The line set out in the Kairos Document, the Harare Declaration, also of 1985[11] and the Lusaka Statement of 1987[12] also deepened the developing confrontation between the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Government. On 24 February 1988, the Government placed severe restrictions upon eighteen major opposition organisations, and the SACC was brought into the forefront of internal protest. Rev. Frank Chikane, the General Secretary of the SACC, held an emergency convocation of churches in May in which it was resolved that the twelve million members of the mostly black organisation would support a policy in which the church would make a strong effort to use 'active non-violent resistance' against Pretoria.[13] According to Chikane, the Church needed to 'take sides on an issue involving justice. The question was not if we

---

[6] Lee, *Guard her children*, 1986, pp 188-202; *Third Way*, 'Slow progress with S Africa's National Initiative for Reconciliation', January 1989; Cassidy, *The passing summer*, 1989, pp. 279-286, Appendices 5-6.
[7] *The Kairos Document: a theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa* (revised second edition, 1986).
[8] *Independent Magazine*, 'Martyrs of Apartheid', 15 July 1989.
[9] Kairos Document, Chapter 5.
[10] Nolan, *God in South Africa*, 1988; Chapter 8.
[11] Declaration of representatives of the World Council of Churches (WCC) meeting in Harare, 6 December 1985
[12] The Lusaka Statement emerged from the WCC consultation on Southern Africa held in Lusaka from 4—8 May 1987 under the theme 'The churches search for justice and peace in Southern Africa'.
[13] Villa-Vicencio, Charles, 'Documentation: the Church-State confrontation February-April 1988' in *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*, No 63, June 1988.

should end apartheid, but how to do so'.[14]

Internationally, in early 1989, the Eminent Church Persons' Group, under the chairmanship of the Rev Canaan Banana, former president of Zimbabwe, targeted countries with close economic ties with South Africa to step up pressure on the Government.[15] This was followed in May by a call for more economic pressure by four leading South African churchmen, Dr Allan Boesak, Dr Beyers Naude, Rev Frank Chikane and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.[16]

While the approaches offered by the NIR and by the Kairos Document raised awareness of the problems within South Africa, neither offered a structural framework within which the conflicting aspirations of the protagonists can be resolved. As the authors of the Evangelical Witness pointed out, a tension existed in the Church between persons supporting individual reconciliation, and those determined radically to oppose the evils of the present order.[17].

But before attempted to evaluate and respond to the different ways of understanding transition, and the dilemma which the Christian community in South Africa and indeed internationally was faced with in confronting the situation prior to the commencement of negotiations, it is necessary to look in more general terms at the nature of Christian peace-making.

---

[14] *Financial Times*, 31 May 1988.
[15] *Baptist Times*, 1 June 1989; report issued by the WCC.
[16] Statement by SA Church Leaders in Washington, DC, 17 May 1989
[17] *Concerned Evangelicals, Evangelical Witness in South Africa: a critique of Evangelical theology and practice by South African Evangelicals themselves*, 1986.

6. Christian Peacebuilding

In this section, I shall look at the biblical foundations for our general call as Christians to work for peace, before analysing the specific task of Christian peacebuilding and what it involves.

(a)   The imperative to work for peace

Christian peace-making is grounded in the work of Christ in whom all things are reconciled (Col 1:20), as indeed He is the One through Whom all things were made (Col 1:19).

(i)   The practical tension between justice and peace

Christians are called to seek peace with one another (Romans 12:18), and by implication between their respective communities. This command to create a world filled with a holistic sense of peace, *shalom*, does not mean turning a blind eye to injustice, be it personal or structural. Indeed, another imperative, that of *mishpat* (justice) requires all people, as bearers of God's image, to work for the restoration of the shattered and distorted social order in which we live. The achievement of justice is a necessary pre-requisite for the establishment of peace, but the justice to be worked for cannot simply be identified with the demands of any one class or party grouping – it must be truly impartial, without bias to the rich or the poor. 'You shall not be partial in judging: hear out the small and great alike…' (Deuteronomy 1:17). Justice must be implemented in all spheres of life – political, social, and economic – so that we might live peacefully with one another. The two objectives of peace and justice are thus inextricably linked.

There is, however, a practical tension between the 'peace-making' and 'prophetic' roles. The peacemaker's objective is to facilitate harmony between conflicting parties while the prophet directly confronts injustice and those responsible for it. If we focus exclusively on the peace-making role, there is the danger that we might underplay injustice and inequality in our attempt to encourage discussion and conciliation. In the prophetic role, we run the risk of alienating one or other of the parties, or both, that we are trying to bring together.

The tension can only be sustained creatively by keeping in view the wider perspective. A biblical view of the world is based on the concept of covenant. While the covenant relates primarily to God's relationship with humanity, if we approach Scripture to see what it says about a whole range of relationships we will find that it provides us with a critique of present injustices and also gives us an outline of what a transformed social order should look like. This vision can then be applied to a conflict situation in an informed and carefully-considered way.

As Christian peacemakers we are thus called to seek reconciliation in very real situations of conflict, without softening our opposition to the injustices which exist. And although we are motivated by our Christian faith and the biblical vision for society, this does not mean that we cannot work with those from different faiths or none at all. As all humanity is created in the image of God we can expect to share common points of ethical concern with those from different faith-communities.

(ii)   Peace-making as a relational call

Moreover, in the Christian understanding of God as Trinity, the relational call which Jesus embodies in himself as the 'person for others' is set within the context of his call and authorisation by his Father, and within the empowering and transforming dynamic as given to him by the Holy Spirit. As we respond to the Father's call and shape our action and our understanding of society by the attitude and example of the Son, our relationships with others are also transformed by the work of the Holy Spirit. This stance not only provides us with our motivation as peacemakers but also provides us with the basis for constructive action in the world created, redeemed and being moved to its final glory by the triune God.

The aim of peacebuilding is to sow seeds for a peace which includes all people and communities within a just and workable framework for the future – unique to each conflict situation – by finding common ground and then setting clearly defined and realistic goals. These goals need to be determined after a careful consideration of all the relevant aspects of the situation being addressed. Sadly, Christians have too often been compromised, for example in situations such as South Africa where an unjust order had been legitimised using 'Christian' arguments. In this case appeal was made to broader Christian principles, which all could embrace and which pointed the way to a constructive change.

Conflicts are inimical to the growth of a truly God-centred society The darkness of the human heart can easily make it a distorting lens whereby even the best-intentioned acts come to be regarded with deep suspicion, and generosity and honesty misconstrued as perfidy. Unhealed wounds can adversely distort relationships, often in ways that may not be fully appreciated by the parties themselves or by any who seek to help in a constructive way. Three elements: prophetic commitment, a healing spiritual dynamic and a concrete vision for the systematic working out, in structural terms, of biblical principles, need to be brought together. This allows framework to be worked out which does not confine the activities of Christians to the 'personal' sphere, but which sketches out the outlines of a biblical framework for society as a whole.

Peace and governance are an integral prerequisite for development. Unless the underlying relational issues can be dealt with, any intervention is likely simply to foster continuing conflict. Conflicts are destructive and divisive. They also distort community structures and inhibit the freedom essential for the healthy growth of all institutions – church, state, family and the range of voluntary associations and enterprises which collectively make up what is called 'civil society'.

(iii)   Christian Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a specific form of peace-making. It is characterised by its systematic character and future-orientation. It does not so much address current grievances as encourage those involved to look beyond the present conflict to ways of living peacefully together in the future. It lays foundations which rest on the common commitment of the participants, with the help of well evidenced contributions by experts, and then proceeds to help those involved in the process to build systematically on these foundations. It thus transforms the participants from a disparate group drawn

from across the political spectrum into an informed and well-equipped network, working together for peace.

Christian peacebuilding is peacebuilding done of the basis of a common set of Christian principles such as can be shared by the participants, whether or not they are themselves Christians. These principles are 'relational' in character – Christianity is a relational religion, as we shall see below. This relational character can be seen in the work of NPI.

(b)   Catalysts and Consensus-builders

Peacebuilding has two functions, which need to operate in tandem: that of being a catalyst and that of being a consensus-builder.

(i)   Catalysts

Peacebuilders can act as catalysts in gaining the trust of the principals and helping to create channels for dialogue in the pre-negotiation phase, continuing to help maintain the channel for communications informally while negotiations are taking place, and then acting to defuse tensions and helping to repair breakdowns of trust in the implementation of the settlement. Confidential contacts need to be made with all the principals by what is called a 'catalyst' so that the sticking points to any future negotiations can be identified and addressed, and that the credentials of the 'catalyst', as a person or group acting in a framework of truth and justice can be accepted. The 'catalyst' can then have an informal supportive role during and after the negotiation of the settlement.

No specific endorsement can be or should be sought from these actors at this time, for the catalysts merely desire to sow seeds for the future; and it is vital that the process should not bear too particular a stamp of any of the principals. The efforts during the pre-negotiation phase must be to establish direct or indirect contacts with the principals to demonstrate to the parties that an eventual settlement is in their interest, for it could further their goals. The catalysts need to suggest to the principal parties ways of dealing with sticking points which might otherwise impede negotiations, thus opening the door for the first steps towards the respective parties coming to the negotiating table.

(ii)   Consensus-builders

At the same time, and in parallel, Christians can help to develop and disseminate a common framework for peace as a point of reference to transcend particular party demands, and as a way of suggesting a just basis on which diverse and conflicting concerns can be resolved. This can be available to the parties during the negotiation process, and in the implementation can contribute to the building-up of an ethos transcending racial, class or ideological differences. A process needs to take place at an informal level, whereby a public programme of consensus-building and education is set in motion, around a framework, such an one informed by biblical principles common to those in the Judeo-Christian tradition which cannot be ascribed to the partisan stance of any one of the parties involved, and thus rejected by the others. This framework then helps to inform and build up the ethos which is needed to sustain a future constitutional settlement.

The consensus-builders need to be able to bear public witness to the fact that a framework, such as one built on thoroughgoing biblical principles common especially to both the black and Afrikaans communities, can transcend racial and ideological barriers, and can be a meeting point for black and white, right and left – a framework which can at once offer a radical and transforming critique of injustices in the present order, and yet suggest ways forward on which the diverse political groupings can find the basis for an agreement.

The aim of the consensus-builders during the pre-negotiation phase needs to be twofold. On the one hand, they are helping to create a climate, through a groundswell of public opinion, both white and black, so that there can in fact be a basis on which negotiations between, or among, the principals can take place. At the same time, they are setting in motion a public debate on the issues, with implications for, and contributions from, the principals, so that when negotiations do take place, there will be a general acceptance in the public mind, both white and black, about the sort of outcome there needs to be. Above all, the concept that any government must rule under the law within an accepted framework of values needs to be well established.

(iii)   The two functions together

Thus the two functions need to operate in tandem: while public opinion is being nurtured and educated, the principal actors, both inside and outside the country, need to be contacted by the catalysts to gain their acquiescence for the process to take place.

A virtuous cycle of confidence building needs to be set in train. The restoration of right relationships is the only basis on which peace can be established. Peace in turn is the basis from which all other objectives can be achieved. In order to restore relationships, there needs to be a process of forgiveness, a relational process which involves a transaction between two or more parties, be they individuals, communities or national groups.

7. The Three Tracks of Peace Facilitation

Peacebuilding can take place along a number of different 'tracks'.[18] For the purpose of this discussion these will be distinguished from one another, but they are not mutually exclusive, can involve many of the same participants, and can reinforce one another. However, in order for them to most effective, it is important that they be clearly distinguished:

(a)   Track One

Track one involves high-level facilitation, which moves towards formal mediation. This involves those in positions of top leadership or those who bear a brief on their behalf. This of necessity operates confidentially or even secretly while in process, but can also be high profile, or become so once the results are announced, or should there be a leak, and therefore still liable to be influenced by public reaction, and pressures from the different constituencies. Typically, Track One addresses the immediate steps required to be put into place for a peace settlement.

(b)   Track Two

This concerns intermediate-level facilitation, operating on a low-profile basis in conducted among persons with middle-range leadership, with influence which reaches both to the high-profile and high-level policy-makers, as well to the grass roots. Typically, Track Two initiatives are sustained and global in their coverage and middle-distance in their focus, i.e. they cover the spectrum of national politics, deal systematically with the frameworks for a post-conflict settlement rather than with immediate issue. While Track Two initiatives reflects communal concerns, it does so not to achieve an immediate resolution of the conflict (as in Track One) but rather to work out ways in which these can be accommodated and taken into account in the middle- to long-term.

(c)   Track Three

This addresses a situation of conflict either at a sub-national level – a region or locality, or conflict arising out of a specific issue or state of affairs and involving grassroots leadership. Unlike a Track Three process these are not comprehensive, and tend to take the form of local or issue-specific dialogues. Because they are carried out at a communal level, the secrecy of Track One, or indeed the confidentiality of Track Three is difficult to sustain. They may tend to take the form of facilitated dialogues rather than that of the mediated negotiation of Track One or the facilitated peacebuilding of Track Two.

---

[18] The terms 'Track One' and 'Track Two' were coined by Joseph Montville ('Foreign Policy According to Freud' in Montville & Davidson, *Foreign Policy*, 1981). The term 'Track Three' is my own, but also relates to the three levels identified by John Paul Lederach (*Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D.C.: United Insitute of Peace,1997): 38-55. I have not followed the nine tracks identified by Louise Diamond and J. McDonald (Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace. Washington, D.C.: Kumarian Press, 1996).

8. The Newick Park Initiative in South Africa (NPI)

We shall look at the NPI first in terms of the process and then in terms of the areas it covered.

(a)   NPI as a Track Two Process

NPI was a Track Two process. It combined the two functions described in general terms in Chapter 6: that of a catalyst and that of a consensus-builder. This group had a dual function in building up a consensus about what the broad outlines of a future South Africa might look like look non-partisan lines, but guided by Christians principles, and secondly by acting as a catalyst to the process, building relationships among those linked to the principals in such a way as to addressing and resolving sticking point in the way of coming to a settlement. The consensus-building role was increasingly taken up by the spin-off from the NPI, the Jubilee Initiative, later renamed the Christian Research for Education and Information for Democracy (CREID).

It all began in 1986 with a paper by Dr Michael Schluter, which looked at the arguments for a just and fair partition in South Africa. Having originally come from South Africa, I (Jeremy Ive) had recently completed my doctoral studies at Cambridge University, and knew Michael from the Round Church in Cambridge. We decided to put this forward in an open-ended way with a number of other constitutional alternatives, ranging from the unitary, federal and confederal alternatives to partition, seen in the light of consideration of the concerns of different communities.[19] Each option was examined in the light of broader Christian principles, which all could embrace, so that discussion could take place with a detailed consideration of clearly set out but realistic alternatives.[20] The plan was to draw on my own South African background and contacts across the racial and political divides to turn these ideas into reality So, on Christmas Day 1986, I found myself on a plane for South Africa with a document in my briefcase which was to set in motion what was to become the 'Newick Park Initiative'.

On the basis of the document, a number of participants from across the racial and political divide were invited to Newick Park, the home of Viscount and Lady Brentford. The character of the initiative was shaped by the range of the different participants at the first of the conferences, looking at the document which had been prepared. Professor Willie Esterhuyse, from Stellenbosch University, and Professor Tjaart van der Walt, Rector of the then Potchestroom University for Christian Higher Education – both senior and influential members of the Afrikaner establishment; Michael Cassidy, the Director of African Enterprise in Pietermaritzburg and a key initiator of the National Initiative for Reconciliation; Professor Richard Stevens, Professor of New Testament at the 'Coloured' (mixed-race) University of the Western Cape; Revd Dr Elia Tema, a respected senior member of the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (the 'African' church within the still racially segregated Dutch Reformed Church 'family'); and the Revd Caesar Molebatsi, leader of Youth Alive in Soweto. These were brought together in the

---

[19] Michael Schluter and Jeremy Ive, 'Alternative constitutional settlements in South Africa: Christian principles and practical feasibility' (Mar 1987), 66 pp.
[20] Michael Schluter and Jeremy Ive, 'Alternative constitutional settlements in South Africa: Christian principles and practical feasibility' (Mar 1987) 66 pp.

first instance in March 1987, but it was decided during that first meeting that this should be the first of series of conferences, in which they and further people of influence close to the then South African Government and the African National Congress should be invited to participate.

Over the period from March 1987 to April 1991 there were a series of consultations involving these and other participants, building up relationships of trust with one another, and considering other issues central to a secure peace in South Africa in the light of common Christian principles. The approach was a non-partisan one, with the participants bridging the political divides, many with positions of influence with respect to the principal actors in the South African conflict. Through regular meetings held in England and South Africa, NPI provided a safe context in which discussion on difficult problems could be carried out amicably and informally, but also objectively, without the media pressure to make partisan statements.

As we shall see in the next section, NPI tackled a range of questions which needed to be addressed in the context of a peaceful transition to African majority rule, including land reform, restructuring the public sector, and industrial ownership. It was an evidence-based process founded on the building of trust and the honest and open sharing of insights with the goal of a just and fully-inclusive peace. Each of the conferences was underpinned by detailed research and, as the process continued, drew on top-level expertise from leading South African and international experts. Through these meetings it was possible to identify values, goals and strategies on which there could be a high degree of consensus, and at the same time narrow down areas of conflict and disagreement where further research and consultation was needed to bring the negotiating parties closer together. It objectives include promoting harmony in social relationships in South Africa by carrying out research, with a particular emphasis on relevant international experience, identifying common values to undergird the new constitutional arrangements which will unite all sections of society behind public policy and development strategies in the new South Africa, ensuring the welfare of the poor and vulnerable through policies which redress current injustices whilst safeguarding political stability and economic growth.

Not long after NPI began, and unbeknownst to most of its participants, a secret initiative came into being at the suggestion of the President of the ANC in exile, Oliver Tambo. This was sponsored by Consolidated Goldfields and organised by Michael Young of that company.[21] It involved a number of those linked to NPI, including Professor Willie Esterhuyse, one of the original participants. This UK-based initiative complemented another secret process which was being pursued by Nelson Mandela himself in captivity, in which members of the white government and the successive State Presidents, PW Botha and FW de Klerk, were directly involved. These two secret parallel processes contributed to the announcement by President FW de Klerk of the release of Mandela, as well as the unbanning of the African National Congress and the other political movements in 1990.

---

[21] This has been the subject of a feature film, Endgame (2010), as well as two books, the latter by Professor Esterhuyse himself: Robert Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to* Mbeki (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Willie Esterhuyse, Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012).

Both these initiatives were highly precarious. When, in December 1988, Mandela had drafted an eleven-page document setting out the basis on which negotiation for the government could proceed, he received a negative response from members of the ANC. When news broke that PW Botha had met Mandela, the members of his party were infuriated.[22] News of the UK-based Consolidated Goldfields process leaked to the press in October 1989. President de Klerk felt he needed publicly to disown it, and leading members of the ANC made strong objections.[23]

NPI operated in tandem with these secret processes. NPI discussions helped to provide a framework for the work of Professor Esterhuyse and other key members of the Afrikaner establishment, together with their ANC interlocutors. As aforementioned, the NPI combined two functions: those of catalyst and consensus-builder. Firstly, as catalyst to the process, it addressed and suggested resolutions to sticking points in the way of coming to a settlement, and secondly it built up a consensus about what the broad outlines of a future South Africa might look like along non-partisan lines. The main ideas were relayed to the SAG and the ANC at a senior level. There is evidence that it made a significant contribution to building up background trust and a common vision among these key players.

First of all there is the process itself and the hopes and fears embedded in it.[24] A broad consensus on fundamental political values and ideals is a basic requirement for a country's stability. Where no such consensus existed, as in South Africa, political stability was at stake. Thus, the first step in agreeing a new constitution needed to be the developing of a consensus about the values or principles that would undergird it. This may well be incorporated into the preamble of a new constitution.

The National Party's and the ANC's values relating to and proposals for a post-apartheid constitution differed in a number of key areas. The NP's philosophy was expressed in President de Klerk's 'Manifesto for the New South Africa' which envisages a liberal democratic capitalist model, whereas the ANC, under the inspiration of the Freedom Charter, looked towards a socialist-oriented system. Moreover, the ANC objected to the NP's emphasis on minority rights, considering it to be an attempt to perpetuate apartheid under a different guise. These matters were addressed cumulatively through the course of the process, as will be seen in the following section.

At the end of January 1991, Professor Esterhuyse (whose participation in both NPI and the secret Consolidated Goldfields process has been described above) and Gerhard Croeser (Director-General of the Department of Finance and NPI participant) made a six-and-a-half hour presentation to the South African Cabinet on the basis of a six-

---

[22] Harvey, *Fall of Apartheid*, p. 184.

[23] Esterhuyse, *Endgame*, p. 242.

[24] Christian initiatives for South Africa's future (Ive, Nov 87) Jubilee Centre Publications: South Africa Series No 1. 10 pp.; The Northern Ireland experience: comparative conclusions relating to South Africa (Catherwood & Ashcroft, Oct 87) 17 pp; Fear as a constitutional problem in South Africa (Tema, Oct 87) 3 pp; White fears (Esterhuyse, Oct 87) 4pp.; Individuals and community in South Africa (Stevens, Oct 87) 3 pp.'; Ethnicity and nation-building: Christian norms, African experience and possible action programme for South Africa (Schluter & Ashcroft, Feb 88) 32 pp.; Alternative strategies to overcome low income white fears of unemployment (Schluter & Porteous, Feb 88), 19 pp; Confidence-building measures and the achievement of constitutional settlement in South Africa (Ive & Ong, June/Oct 88, July 89) 38 pp.; Economic and Social Transformation Priorities within a Christian Framework of Constitutional Settlement. Nov 89, 9 pp.

month process of consultations with a range of different organisations, looking at scenarios for South Africa over the following five to ten years. In a subsequent letter to Michael Schluter, Professor Esterhuyse commented that NPI had provided him with background and insights without which it would not have been possible for him to participate in a meaningful way.[25] In 1992, at a dinner in Brussels, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, the South African Minister for Constitutional Affairs, commented to Sir Fred Catherwood MEP, a Vice-President of the European Parliament and an international participant in the NPI consultations, that the constitutional discussions then taking place would not have been possible were it not for the work of NPI.[26]

Despite its crucial contribution, fundraising was always a problem, made more difficult by the need for the process to remain low-profile. While some limited funding was found from companies and individuals involved in South Africa, finance for airfares, research and staff costs were a constant source of concern, only finally resolved when a generous Christian donor covered the substantial deficit after the end of the process.

The NPI produced offshoots. In November 1989, the South African members of NPI launched the Jubilee Initiative (JI), a dialogue process within South Africa. In mid-1990, this was renamed the Christian Research for Education and Information for Democracy (CREID). CREID helped to feed into the pre-negotiation process a vision of a future South Africa informed by biblical approaches to the challenges of homelessness and of education for all.

(b)   Areas to which the NPI contributed Catalytic Insights

There were a number of different strands in NPI's approach. The earlier conferences were marked by the interweaving of a number of themes: the question of the nature of the constitution, defence and security; the question of the provision of education, welfare and housing and the issues arising out of urbanisation. The later conferences tended to focus on a single theme (unitary and federal constitutions, constitutional safeguards, land reform, ownership and participation in the economy, nationalisation, African participation in the civil service).

Each of the conferences was underpinned by top-level research and expertise from leading South African and international specialists, so that ninety-one research papers were made available to the South African Government and African political parties on these technical areas. Through these meetings it has been possible to identify values, goals and strategies on which there has been a high degree of consensus and at the same time narrow down areas of conflict and disagreement. A direct result was to identify key targeted issues where further research and consultation was urgently needed to bring the parties to the negotiation process closer together.

Making the insights more widely available and developing them further as part of the activity of the Jubilee Initiative, later renamed, the Christian Research, Education and

---

[25] Letter to Michael Schluter of 14 February 1991.
[26] Memo by Sir Fred Catherwood to Michael Schluter, 24 June 1992.

Information for Democracy (CREID), this was partly realised in the publications of the CREID issues on housing[27] and education.[28]

(i) Constitutional structure

Both the ANC and NP agreed that there should be effective regional and local government, but differed profoundly on how to achieve this. The NP proposed a federal constitution with the regions (states) having sovereign and independent jurisdiction over certain areas, while the ANC preferred a unitary system under which the national government will have sovereignty, but will delegate power to subordinate political/territorial units at regional and local level. South Africa will need an effective central government to deal with the deprivations caused by apartheid, but the diverse nature of South African society must also be taken into account, so possible compromise solutions, such as a devolved unitary system or a federal system with strong central government, will be explored.

There was a question as to at what tier at which various government activities will be performed. Whilst issues such as defence, foreign affairs and macro-economic policy will clearly be dealt with at the national level, there is a need to each agreement about which level of government should handle activities such as police, education, welfare, cultural affairs and labour relations.

Effective regional and local government required a secure revenue base, though as the PWV area produces 40-50% of GDP, self-financing of services in the regions will not be feasible, other financing arrangements, such as revenue sharing and intergovernmental transfers to ensure minimum countrywide standards, needed to be examined.

From the start of the process, the question of constitutional structure was addressed and the different options were examined. These issues were returned to several times and at ever greater depth through the course of the consultation process. [29]

---

[27] *Homes for All: The Challenge of Homelessness,* ed. Elaine Cosser (CREID, n.d), 119 pp.

[28] *Education for Life: The Challenge of Schooling for All*, ed. Elaine Cosser (Johannesurd: CREID, 1991), 138 pp.

[29] Alternative constitutional settlements in South Africa: Christian principles and practical feasibility (Mar 87) 66 pp; Unitary and federal forms of transition (Ive, Oct/Nov 87; Oct 89), 13 pp.; Regional Services Councils: a preliminary assessment (Ashcroft/Porteous, Oct 87/Jan 88) 17 pp.; The implications for future constitutional settlement in South Africa of recent and prospective developments in the structures of central government (Ive & Ashcroft, Feb 88) 15 pp.; Multipolarity and covenant: toward a biblical framework for constitutional safeguards (Logsdon, Dec 89), 19pp.; Regional safeguards in federal states (summary) (Wiechers, Feb 90), 4pp.; The Covenant Principles for Democracy: Christian principles for the distribution and exercise of political power and their application in African states, and in particular, to South Africa (Ojiambo & Schluter, Jun 90), 29 pp.; Multi-Party Democracy in African States (Nwabueze, Jun 90), 9 pp.; The Relationship between Central, Regional, and Local Government in Unitary States of Sub-Saharan Africa (Davey, Jun 90), 7 pp.; The Unitary System of Government in South Africa: The role of central, regional and local government (Humphries, Jun 90), 7 pp.; Three-Tiered Federalism: Possibilities for participatory government (Buckingham, Jun 90), 19 pp.; South Africa: The relevance of Federalism and the Lessons of Federal Examples (Dent, Jun 90), 22 pp.; Unitary and Federal Systems: Implications for the economic role of government (Wilkins & Maasdorp, Jun 90), 9 pp.; Systems of Government Structure (Professor Robert Schrire, Apr 91), 9 pp. Responses by Dr A M Ndlovu, 7 pp and Mr Enos Ngutshane, 3 pp.; Federalism: the Nigerian experience (Eleazu, Jun 90), 7 pp.

(ii)   Constitutional safeguards

The ruling National Party argued that in line with other plural societies minority protection within a federal framework should exist in the new constitution to ensure that the majority or any one minority in South Africa should not dominate other minorities. As we have seen (see 'Historical Background') to achieve this, the NP proposed a system of voluntary identification of groups which would be represented in the second chamber of a bi-cameral parliament.

The African National Congress suspected this was merely a device to entrench existing privileges and considers that the rights of people to enjoy their own culture or use their own language should be protected as individual rights, and Minority rights should simply be the aggregate of a particular group's individual rights. Thus, the ANC, in line with international practice, was averse to recognising a racial minority, but was willing to give recognition to cultural, linguistic and religious concerns. [30]

The participants at NPI agreed that rights should not be understood in an individualistic way, but in such a way as protected the integrity of families, churches, and the whole range on institutions through which human freedom finds it expression.[31]

(iii)   Urbanisation

Whereas urban development in much of the world has been built on a firm agricultural base, in South Africa it is the industrial and urban demand which created the agricultural response. The urban industrial core of the PWV (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging) region in the southern Transvaal lies far inland in areas of limited agricultural potential. Its development, and that of Kimberley, reflect the demands of industrial countries for South Africa's minerals since their discovery in the late nineteenth century. In the absence of navigable rivers the region's development has depended on rail transport to the ports of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, and the Mozambiquan capital, Maputo. The addition of Richard's Bay in the 1970s confirms the pattern, whilst the growing importance of a new mining region, the north-west Cape, was confirmed by the building of a new railway from Sishen to a new iron ore port at Saldanha Bay, also in the 1970s. Those railways which link PWV to the east coast ports of Durban, Richard's Bay and Maputo traverse areas of heavier rainfall and high agricultural potential. These are also the areas with the highest population densities, which have historically formed labour reserves for mining and industry, although in recent decades their role has shifted to one of accommodating 'surplus' African population.

Apartheid cities both reflected and reinforced social formation. They supposedly exemplified the fundamental tenet of apartheid ideology that the incompatibility between ethnic groups is such that contact between them leads to friction. In practice race zoning inhibits the limited inter-group social contact which might otherwise occur, for example within churches and sports clubs, aided by the occupational mobility of increasing numbers of blacks. It is also the basis of segregated education, health and

---

[30] Constitutional safeguards for the individual (Diamini, Feb.90), 13pp.; Religious and cultural safeguards for minorities in public international law and comparative constitutional law (Cloete, Feb 90), 27 pp.
[31] See Appendix B.

social services, and as such a highly sensitive issue in white politics. Group areas have, moreover, assumed a new importance since the introduction of the 1983 constitution, as they provided the essential territorial base for the three Houses of the tricameral Parliament. Race zoning also had a strategic function, enabling the containment of violent unrest very largely within African townships, and beyond the daily life experience of whites. Group Areas thus remain a cornerstone of official policy, modified only slightly by the Free Settlement Areas Act of 1988 under which a Free Settlement Areas Board may proclaim selected residential districts open to settlement by all races. In practice these are likely to be those which have already become de facto 'grey' areas, in the face of a surplus of housing in some white group areas in the midst of the major housing shortages suffered by other groups, increasing numbers of whom can afford the better housing to be found in white areas. The limited reforms of 1988 were thus a recognition of changing realities on the ground, supported by the actions of elements of the judiciary and white business, and the more liberal white local authorities.

The resources of a post-apartheid society would allow no dramatic transformation of living conditions for the majority, the more so given the need to provide for the inevitable rapid growth of urban population. This suggested that the emphases within urban areas must be upon guided self-help and upgrading. Houses may be sold on generous terms, repayable over long periods, or perhaps even given to their tenants. Home ownership and security will encourage home improvement. Similarly civic pride and environmental improvement may blossom when local government is in popularly elected hands, uncompromised by the illegitimacy of association with the constitutional reforms of apartheid. The landscape of many townships could be greatly improved at relatively low cost through tree-planting schemes and provision of parks and recreation areas, if the social and political environment were right for these. Planning at the metropolitan level should seek gradually to bring shops, services, recreation facilities and employment to the townships themselves, shifting the centre of gravity away from the 'white' cities.

In all of this, consultation and participation would be of the essence. Africans were tired of being planned for and having things imposed upon them, even when (as is often the case even under Apartheid) the intentions were good. The post-Apartheid state would need to seek ways of incorporating those embryonic organs of people's power which flourished in the mid-1980s, or their successors, in the structures of regional and local government.

In formulating new regional and urban strategies the state would have to face the reality of a massively increased urban African population. Much of this growth would inevitably occur in the core areas of the space economy, and this need not, in South Africa's situation, be inimical to the wider welfare of those who live there. Some deconcentration would be particable, assuming a relatively healthy continuing growth of the economy, to secondary cores with strong potential for growth. Continuing assistance may well have been needed for struggling regions, such as the Eastern Cape at the present time, but with an emphasis on areas and economic sectors within such regions with growth potential. In the periphery of the space economy, the former homelands, the emphasis would be very different: planning for an absolute decrease in population and genuine agricultural development for those who remain, but

abandoning attempts at industrial decentralisation in unpromising locations based on artificial incentives and exploitation of a labour force with no alternatives.[32]

(iv) Land reform

Agreement was building upon the need to facilitate land reform, whilst avoiding the demand for wholesale land nationalisation as was demanded by the Freedom Charter.

The land question was (and is) an issue of great salience. Much of the land had been systematically expropriated during colonial times, so that, as enshrined in the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, 86.2% by law remained exclusively in non-African hands, leaving some 13.8% for African occupation. As the more recent (disastrous) experience in Zimbabwe and the former (more successful) experience in Kenya have shown, the land question has been a source of great grievance and social disruption.[33] It had been addressed in the Freedom Charter to the effect that all the land should be redistributed to those who work it, and all should have the right to occupy the land wherever they choose.[34]

The land question had been addressed at a number of meetings of the Newick Park Initiative.[35] The discussion of the land questions NPI in October 1990[36] was followed by a shift in ANC policy, such as at a conference which took place later that month where it was put forward that land nationalisation should not be the only policy method used, and that selective nationalisation in a mixed economy should be the approach adopted.

The Freedom Charter called for substantial and immediate transfer of land to Africans, including by expropriation where necessary. The white South African Government had suggested the removal of discriminatory legislation and the introduction of measures to

---

[32] This is mainly taken from acomposite paper by Johannes Wessels, no title, draft 1 (Oct. 1989). See also: Christian principles for urban policy (Ashcroft & Schluter, June 89), 19pp.; Urban policy in sub-Saharan Africa: an overview and Christian assessment (Schluter and Barber, Jan. 90), 30 pp.; Urbanisation and Metropolisation in South Africa (Kok, Finlayson & Smit, July 89), 33 pp.; Urban policy options to prevent overcrowding, and the site and location of urban settlement (Lemon, July 89) 23pp.; Black Housing in South Africa: The Need for Shelter (Wessels, June 89), 56pp

[33] Land reform in Kenya and Zimbabwe: some lessons for South Africa (Ashcroft, Feb 88) 15 pp.; The Zimbabwean Experience and Lessons for South Africa (Nyoni, Oct 90), 17 pp.

[34] http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72

[35] Land Rights and Obligations as a Moral Basis for Constitutional Settlements in South Africa (Schluter, July 87) 32 pp.; The historical and ethical background to the land question in South Africa (Ashcroft, Oct 87) 16 pp.; Land reform: potential and priorities for South Africa (Porteous, July/Oct 88) 29 pp.; Financing and implementing land reform in Asia: some lessons for South Africa (Ashcroft, May 88), 17 pp; On What Basis do Whites have a Legitimate Place in the New South Africa (Ovey, Oct 90); Christian Principles for the Ownership and Distribution of Land (Schluter & Ashcroft, with response by du Toit, Oct 90), 20 pp.; Land Reform: Potential and Priorities for South Africa (Porteous, Aug 90), 41 pp.; The Political Economy of Post-1960 Dispossession in South Africa (Mbongwa, Oct 90), 23 pp.; An overview of current forms of Black Land Tenure (Olivier, Oct 90), 20 pp.; International Experience in the Implementation of Land Reform (S. Cross, Oct 90); Land Reform: A User's Guide (Based on Latin American Experience). (Lehmann, Oct 90), 9 pp.; Opening Access: An Assessment of Market-Based Options for Land Reform in South Africa (M. de Klerk, 39 pp, with response by Skweyiya, 6 pp, Oct 90); The Potential to Increase Black Smallholder Production in South Africa Inside and Outside the Homelands: Two Perspectives (Christodoulou, 44 pp; Abrahamse, 9 pp, Oct 90; The European Community's Experience in Smallholder Support Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Blonk, Oct 90), 9 pp.; Legal Alternatives to Communal and Individual Ownership (Latsky, 52 pp; with responses by Dlamini, 13 pp; and C. Cross, 12 pp, Oct 90).

[36] See Appendix D.

assist African farmers, but its proposals have been criticised as not going far enough. Despite the imminent repeal of the Land Acts, 85% of farm land is still white owned. Policies need to give white farmers security of tenure to maintain food production and ensure continued investment in the agricultural sector while ensuring sufficient transfer of land to satisfy African aspirations.

From the conference, it became clear that most agricultural production was still in the hands of white commercial famers and that any large-scale nationalisation of the land would have serious adverse effects on agricultural production and food security, and would involve, through additional pressure on scarce foreign exchange, considerable additional costs on industrial production and employment. That conference explored alternative measures to ensure food security while embarking on a systematic policy of land ownership transfers:

Land Reform Commission

The NPI recommended a Land Reform Commission to oversee the reform process. Its composition needed to ensure it has necessary expertise and political legitimacy, in particular to balance different concerns about land reform. Research will be required to define its terms of reference, including matters such as:-
- o deciding on the approach to be adopted by Land Claims Court to be established to consider the claims of the dispossessed
- o identifying land that can readily be transferred
- o deciding on the basis of selection of households for resettlement
- o the reform of the present land tenure system and the development of new forms of tenure to act as a bridge between individual 'freehold' tenure of white farmland and the traditional communal systems of African areas
- o the upgrading of existing rights, the unification and simplification of land registration and town planning systems and the review of related alters.

Measures to secure food production

A prime objective of any effective land reform programme must be to maintain adequate food production to protect the interests of the urban population and to prevent valuable foreign exchange being used to import food instead of equipping industry. The transfer of land to African farmers without the provision of adequate support structures would inevitably lead to a considerable loss of agricultural production. Research and consultation about the development of effective policies in the following areas is accordingly a priority:
- o detailed plans for an affirmative action programme to enable African farmers to acquire and make productive use of land that becomes available
- o plans to identify farmers and farms for affirmative action implementation;
- o strategies to assist African smallholder farmers, such as the Development Bank's 'Farmer Support Programme'
- o the elimination of distortions favouring large farmers, the extension of the full range of subsidy assistance to all types of farmer and the associated revision of marketing and output pricing structures
- o Adjustment of extension and marketing provision to meet the needs of different types of farming system, including marginal small-holdings in

the former 'homelands', and not just large-scale commercial agriculture.

It was about this time that the ANC finally decided to move away from its previous policy of land nationalisation and instead recognised the need for a cautious and deliberate approach to the resolution of the land question.[37]

(v) The Structure of industry and the nationalisation question

In the course of its deliberations about the structure of industry and the industrialisation question, NPI left a body of material to be drawn upon.[38]

The South African economy was (and remains) highly concentrated; a few firms producing a high proportion of output in many sectors. It was also highly centralised across sectors; a significant part of the private sector comes under the control of a few large conglomerates and insurance groups. Anglo American alone was said to control up to 45% of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

Due to their absolute size, conglomerates had (and still have) strong influence over the general direction and nature of investment in the private sector. The ANC, suspicious of the power of big business, objected to the concentration of economic power and believes that Africans should acquire a substantial stake in the 'commanding heights' of the economy. However, the business community argued that state intervention would run the risk of killing the golden goose or causing it to fly overseas, and the welfare of those on a low-income depends on maintaining the confidence of industry and foreign investors.

The participants at NPI agreed on common principles which at once recognised the need for structural reform and empowerment, while at the same time preserving the integrity and productivity of the economy. With respect the nationalisation of industry,

---

[37] *Financial Times*, 15 Nov 1990 by Patti Waldmeier.

[38] Report (with summary) on the structure of the South African economy and its implications for decentralised government (Porteous, Sept 87) 77 pp.; Financing and implementing land reform in Asia: some lessons for South Africa (Ashcroft, May 88), 17 pp.; The Christian case for the diffusion of economic power (Catherwood, May 88), 8 pp.; The transfer of business ownership and control to Africans in independent African states: a study of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Campanale, Oct 88), 63 pp. Response by Gamaliel O. Onsode, Jan 91, 8 pp.; The FAIR business policies: ten proposals (Porteous, July 89), 39pp. Ownership and management in the South African Economy (Porteous, Jan 91), 68 pp.; Centralization and Concentration in the South African Economy (Professor Gavin Maasdorp, Jan 91), 20 pp. Response by Eugene Nyati, 10 pp.; Government Regulation of Large Business Enterprise (Dr V Diova, Jan 91), 17 pp.; Structural Options for Matching Rights and Obligations in the Public Company (Professor Anthony Asher, Jan 91), 12 pp. Response by Professor Sam Zondi, 5 pp.; Mutual Involvement and Ownership, Organisation and Management of the South African Gold Mining Industry (Dr Michael Hodson, Jan 91), 38 pp. Response by Martin Nicol, 6 pp.; Pre-conditions, objectives and mechanisms for introducing Employee Ownership in South Africa (Mr Robert Oakeshott, Jan 91), 7 pp.; The Industrial Sector, Economic Development and Nationalization (McCarthy, Jan 91), 13 pp.; American Experience with Structural Changes by Anti-Trust Actions (Professor William G Shepherd, Jan 91), 28 pp.; Enhancing the Effectiveness of Competition Policy in South Africa (Dr Pierre Brooks, Jan 91), 8 pp.; Education and Training Schemes for African Entrepreneurship in South Africa (Mr Mashudu Ramano, Jan 91), 23 pp.; African Small Business Development: Access to Capital and Subcontracting as a Solution to the Problem (Mr Batsile, S Molebatsi, Jan 91) , 11 pp.; Christian FAIR Business Principles and Reform of South Africa's Business Structures (Schluter, Jan 91), 30 pp. (updated version of paper); An overview of the Role of the Public Sector in the South African Economy (Prof Elwil Beukes, Apr 91), 27 pp.; Privatization and the Restructuring of Parastatals in South Africa (Professor Stef Coetzee, Apr 91), 12 pp.

especially the mines, where also the dangers of the discussion of the question of industrial nationalisation was followed by a discussion document being distributed by the ANC among its members highlighting the disadvantages of nationalisation, including the dangers of precipitating capital flight, and resolved to look at alternatives to the policy. Statist intervention was moved away from and ways to empower and encourage black involvement at all levels of the management structure were put forward for further investigation.[39]

Following the NPI consultation on this topic of January 1991, the ANC distributed a discussion document to its members highlighting the disadvantages of nationalisation arguing that it needed to look more carefully at the economic reality and identify a policy framework that would begin to solve the problems involved. Modification of ANC policy in this regard contributed greatly to the likelihood of reaching an agreement in any formal process. It thus helped to encourage the SAG to embark on the process which led eventually to peaceful transition to full democracy.[40]

(vi)   The financial sector

The financial system played a significant role in determining which sections of South African society, which sectors of industry and which geographical regions receive investment and benefit from economic growth. Nationalisation of the banks may still come onto the ANC's economic agenda as a means of achieving its developmental objectives, although there appears to be a softening of this stance in favour of other forms of social control. The business community argues that nationalisation would be a 'heart attack' for the economy which would destroy investor confidence and the foundations of industrial growth.[41]

Experiences of nationalisation in other countries suggest that this approach may not resolve grievances over credit allocation. Alternative means of increasing the African stake in the economy and achieving balanced regional growth include:
- o   the promotion of African owned and managed financial institutions
- o   mobilising long-term savings in support of infrastructural(development, e.g. housing
- o   requiring greater disclosure of certain policies and practices by financial institutions, and setting agreed targets for reaching socially desirable goals
- o   the establishment of new institutions to fill gaps in services
- o   the encouragement of grass roots 'community banking' initiatives
- o   the promotion of small business sub-contracting, i.e. the purchase of goods, components or services from small business by big business
- o   fiscal measures by the government, such as differential rates of corporation tax to encourage African business development, co-operatives, partnerships and entrepeneurship.

---

[39] See Appendix E.
[40] *Financial Times*, 22 Feb 1991 by Patti Waldmeier.
[41] Heart Attack? Bank Nationalization in South Africa: Implications and Alternatives (Mr David Porteous, Jan 91), 92 pp. Response by H P de Villiers, 7 pp

(vii) The public service

The apartheid system created a bureaucratic nightmare. The establishment of separate 'homeland' civil services and 'own affairs' administrations has resulted in thirteen different departments responsible for education, health and other essential services, rather than one national department. Moreover, although whites have experienced a relatively efficient 'first world' civil service, in the homelands the civil services tend to be 'third world' rather than 'first world'. In the delivery of services, the civil service still favoured whites, while Africans believed it had been used as an instrument of control in their daily lives, and had little confidence in the current structures. Substantial restructuring was therefore required, including the integration of the ten 'homeland' civil services and the three 'own affairs' administrations into appropriate national or regional structures; and the re-orientation of the approach of public sector organisations towards a developmental, instead of a controlling, attitude.

Furthermore, the public sector had for many years been used as an instrument for patronage by successive NP governments. At least 22% of the economically active white population was employed in the public sector, and the percentage of Afrikaners employed was undoubtedly higher. On the other hand, only 0.5% of the top five income categories were filled by Africans, and in major public corporations a negligible percentage of senior management posts are occupied by Africans. Moreover, in the Public Service Bursary Scheme, a considerably higher proportion of acceptable applications submitted by whites were successful in comparison to those submitted by Africans.

The white government had guaranteed that white civil servants' jobs would be safeguarded in any new constitutional dispensation, but opposition African groupings were demanding there should be rapid infusion of Africans into the public sector at all levels following transition. These conflicting demands needed to be reconciled.

(viii) Defence and security

Since a single unified defence force for South Africa was created in 1912, the structure of the defence force (later the SADF) had been steadily refined and reorganised to create a highly rationalised institution able to respond to the demands made of it. The tenure of PW Botha as Minister of Defence was particularly significant in forging the defence force into an organisation with clear lines of command and with a distinction between executive and administrative functions.

The Defence Force had always been orientated towards the preservation of internal security and this is reflected in the system of area commands. All Permanent and Citizen Force units as well as Commandos come under the head of each area command for training, housing, administrative and disciplinary purposes. This officer was responsible for preventing insurgency in his area and the organisation of civil defence.

The Defence Force was a citizen army with a professional core, with the professional Permanent Force constituting only 28% of the total number of those under arms at any one time. The basic model of the primacy of civilian government over the military was deeply ingrained in white South African political culture and there was reluctance among the general population to allow this to be changed. Civil leaders were still regarded as competent to deal with national issues and this gave little ability to

legitimise the penetration of politics by the military. The 'total onslaught' ideology had been seen as one way in which the government has attempted to legitimise the growing political influence of the military and the National Security Management System (NSMS).

However, the SADF was seen by many in the African, 'Coloured' and Indian communities as an instrument of apartheid, particularly after the role of the SADF in dealing with unrest in the townships. These reservations were also increasingly shared by many whites, particularly English-speakers. Culturally, the SADF had come to be regarded as a predominantly Afrikaans-speaking institution. English-speaking whites tended to be less strongly committed to the defence of the present South African order than their Afrikaans-speaking counterparts as they had a greater ability to sell their skills elsewhere. The growing death toll in the SADF's field operations also contributed to public disenchantment with military service.

Although the business community might have benefitted from defence procurement, the relationship between the military and the private sector was often uneasy. The business community had a different political strategy as it tended to see reform as the way to peace and stability and was fearful of the military's resource requirements. The disruption of personnel through national service, conflict over responsibility for the defence of 'key areas' and the fear of production being diverted to military requirements were all sources of conflict.

In parliament the influence of the military and the NSMS disturbed those MPs and even National Party members who increasingly realised that they were excluded from the real areas of power. Some civil servants also feared that they may become redundant as the military took over their roles. Of a total annual defence budget of RI 970 million in 1980-1981, RI.200 million was allocated for Special Account purposes. Another hidden cost of defence was the development of what some describe as a military-industrial complex. Were the security situation to worsen considerably, costs could escalate dramatically.

The changes in the structure of central government, particularly the development of the State Security Council and the National Security Management System had given the military establishment considerable opportunities to exert political influence.

The predominantly white composition of the SADF, with the very limited recruitment and promotion opportunities for blacks, made it unlikely that it would be a sufficiently broad-based force to undergird far-reaching political change. The interests of both the SADF as an institution and of individual soldiers lay in the preservation of a white-dominated state and so the political involvement of the military should have been expected to be directed to this end. However, the increasing involvement of the SADF rather than just the SAP in controlling the townships was evidence of the political importance of the former. The military had influenced change through the total strategy concept with all areas of policy being seen as related to security.

There was a need for a military structure which would undergird and not undermine any political settlement. There needed to be a greater integration of civil and military structures, with the latter as far as possible responsible to the former at both central

and regional levels. There needed also to be a decentralisation of military power, to minimise the effects of military intervention at the centre.

A structure which might have met these requirements might first of all comprise a system of non-racial militia commissions corresponding to each level of civil government appointed by the relevant civil authority at each level of government, with clearly defined powers and responsibilities allocated to the commissioners at each level. The chairman of each militia commission would sit on the commission for the level above so that there would be efficient channels of command and control, and close liaison could be maintained between the levels and between the militia commissions of neighbouring regions and districts and marginal areas.

At the same time there would need to be a tight regulation of the regional military structures through a central command and inspectorate. A central military academy to train the officers from all the regions would further assist in the creation of a common sense of national identity and loyalty, with uniform training, equipment and operational procedures for all the regions.

(ix)   Other areas

Other areas covered were family policy,[42] welfare[43] and education.[44]

(c) Initiatives by Some Individual Members of NPI

The process fed into various initiatives in which individual NPI members were engaged:

(i)   Professor Willie Esterhuyse

NPI included among its members Professor Willie Esterhuyse, who was also the key interlocutor on behalf of the white establishment (and indeed the South African National Intelligence Service) with the ANC. Esterhuyse was drawn into the secret process initiatives by Michael Young of Consolidated Goldfields (a member of the group of British companies whom NPI kept regularly informed of its progress). Young had proceeded on the basis of an indicated given to him by Oliver Tambo. Esterhuyse's involvement in that process was picked up by the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS), who made him the conduit which eventually because the direct channel between it and the ANC. In addition to this catalytic role, Esterhuyse also played a consensus building role, when, as he was involved in an exercise working with a team of others from different political backgrounds canvassing different business models. In his book, *Endgame*, Esterhuyse mentions NPI, in which he participated, in relation to other initiatives in facilitating the move to the peaceful transition of power from white rule to full democracy in South Africa.[45]

---

[42] Constructing a New Framework for Economic Policy: Family Priorities Under Growing Pressures of Social and Economic Change (Schluter, May 88), 7 pp.; Safeguards for the family: a South African perspective (Van Wyk, Feb 90), 12pp.

[43] Biblical principles for the provision of welfare (Ashcroft, Oct 88), 31 pp.

[44] Christian principles for the educational structure. (Ashcroft & Barber, Feb 89), 29 pp.; Educational policy in sub-Saharan Africa: an overview (Barber), 36 pp.; The factual situation of education in South Africa (Auerbach, Sept 89) 35pp;

[45] *Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012)

(ii)   Revd Caesar Molebatsi

The Revd Caesar Molebatsi, Co-Director of the Jubilee Initiative (later CREID) had become leader of Youth Alive Ministries in 1976, and subsequently became the Director of Youth Alive Development Foundation, the resource arm of the Youth Alive organisation. In addition, he was the Pastor of Ebenezer Evangelical Church in Dobsonville, Soweto, which he founded in 1981, as well as the host of 'Two Way', a popular television audience participation programme, highlighting the encouraging debate on issues germane to the South African situation. In the period leading up to the first democratic election, he played an important role in helping to provide community leadership and calm in the febrile atmosphere in the African 'township' of Soweto, not least in the period immediately after the assassination of the senior ANC leader, Chris Hani in 1993, in the dangerous situation immediately before the first fully-democratic elections the following year.[46]

(iii) Dr Theuns Eloff

Dr Theuns Eloff was the other Co-Director of the Jubilee Initiative, the South Africa spin off of the Newick Park Initiative. He was an ordained minister of the Gereformeerd Kerk (Reformed Church), and was part of the delegation which met the ANC leadership in Dakar in 1987, for which he was forced to leave the ordained ministry in 1989. After leaving the ministry he joined the Consultative Business Movement (CBM), consisting of senior business leaders who wished to contribute to a peaceful transition to democracy, where he was appointed as Executive Director in 1990. As such he helped to facilitate the signing of the Peace Accord in 1991. During his time with CBM, he was seconded to lead the Secretariat for the two phases of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1991 and 1992, and then subsequently came to head the administration of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process in 1993 until the negotiated Interim Constitution was adopted. In 1994 served as Deputy Executive Director of the Transitional Executive Council, which prepared the way for the first democratic elections in 1994.

The CBM also provided administrative support for the mediating initiative of Professor Washing Okumu, which prepared the way for the last minute peaceful entry of the Inkatha Freedom Party into the electoral process.

In 1995 Dr. Eloff was appointed as Chief Executive of the National Business Initiative. He served on the Economic Advisory Council of the North-West Province, the Board of Business Against Crime and the Board of the Centre for Conflict Resolution. In 2002 he became Vice-Chancellor of the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education. In 2004 he was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the newly merged North-West University.

(iv) Dr Michael Cassidy

Another person who was equipped by the process was Michael Cassidy, the founder and Director of African Enterprise, an all-African evangelistic organisation, based in

---

[46] Caesar Molebatsi, *A Flame for Justice* (Lion Publishing, 1991); Paul Vallely, 'Can the Centre Hold?', *The Tablet*, p. 8, 24th April 1993 http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/24th-april-1993/8/south-africa-can-the-centre-hold

Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, who facilitated the Kolobe process between 1992 to 1993; in the Rustenburg process leading to the National Peace Accord; and finally in helping to facilitated the role of Professor Washington Okumu in mediating between the ANC led by Nelson Mandela, and the Inkatha Freedom Party lead by Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi.[47]

(v)   Professor Washington Okumu

Most dramatically of all, NPI prepared the way for the mediation by Professsor Washingto Okumu, formerly Director of the NPI, between the ANC, NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which drew South Africa back from the violent confrontation between the IFP and the ANC, and which brought the IFP into the transitional general election of 1994.

Professor Okumu, a Kenyan, was appointed Executive Director of Newick Park Initiative 1988. Previously he had been, in 1962, Executive Officer, Kenyan Treasury and Ministry of Economic Planning and Constitutional Affairs, and Cabinet Secretary to pre-Independence Coalition Government. Then, in 1964, he was Chief Establishment Officer and Commercial Manager, East African Railways and Harbours, in 1970 Head of Commercial Section of American Embassy, Nairobi and then in 1971 Head of Industrial Development Decade for Africa and Chief of Economic Co-operation among Third World Countries in United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. Finally, in 1986, was appointed Senior Technical Adviser, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, Government of Zambia as well as Professor of Economics at Institute of European Studies, Vienna.

At the meeting of NPI of June 1990, Professor Okumu was asked by the Director of the NPI to facilitate a meeting between President FW de Klerk, Nelson Mandela and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, which he followed up with a meeting in London with Chief Buthelezi, who indicated that he would be very happy for such a meeting.[48] Professor Okumu had a long-standing friendship with Chief Buthelezi as well as contacts with senior members of the ANC and South African establishment – the latter both within the context of NPI as well as personally.

In the early months of that 1994, Northern Natal was a tinderbox for potential violence. The US State Department was predicting that 100,000 people were likely to die by the end of April if the election went ahead without IFP's involvement. The potential for violence from IFP supporters living in single quarters on the gold mines in the central metropolitan area (now called Gauteng) was also considerable.

Upon being involved in 1994, unlike his high profile fellow facilitators, Dr Henry Kissinger and Lord Carrington, he was able to draw on these relationships and his detailed understanding of the South African situation rapidly to mount a personal mediation of the pre-election crisis, and to persuade Chief Buthelezi and the IFP to enter the election. This intervention was facilitated from outside the country by Dr Michael Schluter (and his mother Mrs Evelyn Schluter, later Foot), and from inside the country

---

[47] Michael Cassidy, A Witness of Ever (Hodder & Stoughton, 1995)
[48] Fax from Professor Washing Okumu to Basil Landau, 26th July 1990.

by Michael Cassidy of African Enterprise, and the Consultative Business Movement – both, as we have seen, with links to NPI.

Professor Okumu was able to build on the relationships previously made and his detailed understanding of the South African situation derived not least from the NPI process rapidly to mount a personal mediation of the pre-election crisis, persuading Chief Buthelezi and the IFP to enter the election. His flights to South Africa were paid for by a donor with close links to NPI. The whole process was undergirded by prayer, including the 'Jesus Peace Rally' of 17 April for which 30,000 gathered in the King's Park Stadium in Durban to pray for the forthcoming elections. Professor Okumu's mediation brought the IFP into the transitional general election of 1994 and so the country avoided the inter-communal conflagration which otherwise would almost certainly have resulted.[49]

---

[49] That is a story which has been told, at least in part by Michael Cassidy, *A Witness for Ever*, pp. 141-214.

9. A Relational Audit of the Newick Park Initiative

In looking at the Newick Park Initiative, it is possible to identify a number of key factors which helped to undergird it. I shall be using the Relational Principles, identified by Dr Michael Schluter (with the order slightly changed for the purpose of this analysis).

At the heart of the Christian faith is the community of love among the divine Persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Humanity is created in God's image as persons-in-relationship (Gen 1:27). This applies to relations between individual persons, but also those between ethnic groups and nations (e.g. Amos chapter 1). It is possible to identify five relational principles drawn from biblical insights to evaluate the NPI initiative.[50]

The five relational principles were derived from biblical thinking as a way of providing categories for relational analysis of public policy and process.

(a)   Parity

The starting point for any peacebuilding process is mutual respect and appreciation of the other person's dignity grounded in the biblical insight that all human beings are created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27). Every person is dependent on our Heavenly Father, whether we, or they, recognise it or not (Matt. 6:26). High levels of parity tend to foster commitment to a relationship. Low levels of parity lead to disenchantment and disengagement.

Parity is about **mutual dignity** and respect. High levels of parity tend to foster commitment to a relationship. Low levels of parity lead to disenchantment and disengagement. It needs to be distinguished from equality. There may be legitimate differences of power and influence in a relationship but these should be referenced only for the parties to help one another, not to manipulate or control.

The neutral location and the fact that all the participants attended in their personal capacity meant that jockeying for power or influence was minimized.

(b)   Directness

Directness is about the nature and quality of the **communication processes** in a relationship. Opportunities for direct face to face meetings between protagonists in a conflict are often all too scarce. Communication is more effective when face to face.

Above all, there is God's supreme self-revelation in the incarnation, i.e. the becoming human, of God's Son in the person of Jesus (Matthew 1:23; John 1:14). The biblical command that we should love our neighbours as ourselves (Lev. 19:18; Matt 19:19 and parallels) is modelled on the way Jesus related to all those with whom He dealt, giving Himself to others even to the point of death.

---

[50] For an exposition of the relational principles see Michael Schluter and David Lee, *The R Factor* (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1993).

In the case of NPI, opportunities were provided for participants to tell their stories to one another in a group session and to build up trust through face to face conversation in a safe environment. The confidential character of the process made directness possible.

(c) Continuity

Continuity is about **time and stability.** Change in relationships can, at times, be necessary and beneficial but it is important that there are effective processes in place to maintain continuity in the underlying relationships through the change process. It takes time for mutual understanding to develop.

God's steadfast love (Hebrew 'hesed') takes the form of successive covenants revealed and worked out through history, continuing God's promises from one generation to another (Gen 9:12, 17:7, Exod. 3:15;12:14,17 etc.). Jesus promises that He will be with us always until the end of the present age (Matt 28:20), and indeed in the age to come (Rev 22:5). In the light of this, Christians are exhorted to hold firm as a future-orientated community until the return of our Lord (Heb. 10:25).

The NPI process continued over the course of four years with a continuing core group of participants building up their knowledge and trust of one another over time. It also drew others into the group, and fed their growing consensus out to third parties.

(d) Multiplexity

Multiplexity is concerned with the **breadth of knowledge** both personally and organisationally in a relationship. It is about understanding not just the other person's personal background, interests, and motivation, but also about understanding the goals, aspirations and constraints of the other party. It fosters trust, accountability and understanding. If limited, then a relationship may be founded on many false assumptions. Positively, unrealized areas of joint interest and activity can be identified.

Multiplexity is based on the biblical understanding that God made the created order good in all its diversity (Gen. 1:31) and understands every aspect of our complex lives (Ps. 139).

The safe space and the time allowed for the unfolding of the process gave the participants the opportunity to get to know one another not just as interlocutors but within the wider context of their backgrounds and concerns. All the issues looked at within NPI were examined systematically in the light of all the aspects of the South African situation. Although the focus might be on one or two issues at the conference, the commitment of the process as a whole and its research programme was to deal comprehensively and in depth with the whole. Opportunity was also allowed for issues to be examined in the light of international experience.

(e) Commonality

Commonality is a foundation of **common purpose,** whether expressed through a strong single overarching identity or through joint work and agreement on specific issues.

There is a common call to all of humanity to love God with all our heart, the centre or who we are, which gathers in every aspect of our different identities (Deut. 6:4; Matt. 22:37 and parallels). This common call transcends the differences of identity and ideology. This does not mean absolute uniformity. Indeed, difference and diversity can be seen positively as enriching a relationship.

There was a shared acceptance by all the participants of the Christian basis of the initiative, and all were committed to a peaceful and just resolution of the 'apartheid' question on that basis. This bound the participants together, regardless of political affiliation, culture or ethnicity, into working together for peace within a framework of jointly accepted principles.

10. Conclusion

Up to now, the Newick Park Initiative has been largely unrecognised. However, as we have seen, NPI not only built up background trust on Christian basis among the key actors, but catalysed the constructive resolution of some of the key issues in the final settlement. It can also be argued that it contributed in a significant way to the breakthrough in 1990 with the release of Mandela and the eventual transition to fully representative democracy in 1994. The key ideas were relayed to the white-led South African Government and the ANC at a senior level, and it made a substantial contribution to the building up background trust and a common vision between those key players.

Further, in conjunction with its local spinoff, the Jubilee Intitiative, later Christian Research Education and Information for Democracy (CREID), it helped to feed into the pre-negotiation process in South Africa a picture of a future South Africa informed by the biblical approaches to a number of key issues.

In the course of this work, a distinctive 'Newick Park' approach was developed, which involved the following features:
- Informal consultation for key mid-level participants
- A continuing process over several years
- Neutral territory, with all those attending on a personal basis
- No press statements
- One or two issues looked at in depth
- A combination of local and international expertise

A similar approach was taken up in different contexts by two further NPI programmes – in Rwanda and Sudan.[51]

Rwanda 1994-99. In Rwanda, where the churches had been compromised even more deeply through the involvement of church leaders in the genocide, the common Christian commitment of Tutsi and Hutu provided a way for real dialogue and understanding to be re-established dispute deep bitterness and distrust.

Sudan from 1999 (and since 2003, Concordis International, the successor organisation to the NPI)**.** In Sudan, the commitment to common theistic beliefs as members of the Abrahamic faiths made common ground possible for settlements between North and South and within other regions. Namely, it prepared the way and created the background trust for the Machakos protocols which ended the North-South war, which up to that point had claimed some 2 million lives. Not only did it have participants from North and South, it also had participation from all the areas of the country including the West (i.e. Darfur), the centre (the Nuba mountains) and the East (the Beja region).

NPI was able to make its contribution to the decisive breakthroughs in South Africa in February 1990, and Sudan in July 2002) because of its transcendent focus – it operated

---

[51] For its initiative in Sudan, NPI was renamed 'Relationships Foundation International' (RFI). RFI later became an independent charity called 'Concordis International'.

in terms of an overarching framework above and beyond any party political objective, based on a common recognition of God as the foundation of all justice and right relationships and the biblical vision of a society opened up by God's *shalom*. In each case, NPI operated in terms of an overarching framework above and beyond any party political objective, based on a common recognition of God as the foundation of all justice and right relationships – in the South African and Rwandan cases with a specifically Christian focus, and in Sudan because there was a shared claim to belief in God as revealed to Abraham.

Other national conflicts may indeed be amenable to the kind of approach exemplified by NPI. In such cases, the NPI experience suggests a number of lessons. There needs to be careful identification of the main parties in the conflict and their competing interests and aspirations. A group of participants identified as being close to the central protagonists, and yet not directly in the public eye, should be invited in their personal capacities and a programme undertaken to set out the issues to be considered. The focus of the discussions should be middle- to long-term questions, looking beyond the immediate conflict to a long-term basis for its resolution and the associated benefits for all parties. Even in cases where people may not share a belief in God, by calling participants to the transcendent basis for humane action, it is possible to move them beyond the constraints of the conflict which divides them to outline a future which they, and their respective constituencies, can share.

Understood in this way, Christian peacebuilding can be applied in many other contexts, not merely national ones, but also within family, work, or community contexts. Just as at a national level, there is room for the sustained facilitation and accompaniment of initiatives such as NPI provided, so in work or domestic issues, the same principles and experience can be applied

NPI is a recent and powerful example of Christian peacebuilding. It can be seen, alongside other turning points in national histories, as an instance of God's providence and so is offered by way of encouragement to Christians in situations of national conflict. At the same time, it can be seen as an admittedly imperfect and limited model for Christian peacebuilding at a national level, from which both Christians and non-Christians alike might develop guidelines about how similar processes can be set up in other contexts of conflict, whether domestic, local or national. It is offered here as a source of encouragement both to Christians and to other people of good-will. The Christian basis provided both a meeting point, but also a shared foundation for discussions across the political divides. In this way it serves as a practical witness to the just and gentle rule of our Lord, the Prince of Peace, at a national level and over all areas of life.

Appendices

A. Attendees

Among those who attended one or more of the consultations of the NPI were the following:

- Mr Mzwai Piliso, Member of the National Executive Committee and Director, Department of Manpower Development, ANC, Johannesburg.
- Zola Skweyiya, Director of the ANC's Legal Department and Chairman of the ANC's Constitutional Committee, ANC, Johannesburg.
- The Honourable Enos J Mabuza, former Chief Minister of KaNgwane.
- Mr Nathaniel Masemola, Chairman of the ANC Constitutional Sub-Committee on Land and the Economy.
- Mr Max Sisulu, Head of ANC's Department of Economic Policy, Johannesburg.
- Mr Tito Mboweni, Member of the ANC's Department of Economic Policy.
- Mr Papie Moloto, Administrative Secretary, Department of Manpower Development, ANC, Johannesburg.
- Mr Richard Maponya, Chairman of the Maponya Group, Johannesburg.
- Prof Wiseman Nkuhlu, Principal and Vice-chancellor of the University of Transkei, Chairman of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry's Economic Research Unit.
- Prof S J Zondi, Dean, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, University of Zululand.
- Mr Gerhard P Croeser, Director-General, Department of Finance, Republic of South Africa.
- Dr Piet Koornhof, former South African Ambassador, Washington DC, and ex Cabinet Minister.
- Prof Pieter de Lange, former Rector of Rand Afrikaans University and Chairman of the Broederbond.
- Mr Naas Steenkamp, Executive Director, Gencor Ltd. Senior vice-president of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa.
- Mr Henri de Villiers, Chairman, Standard Bank of South Africa.
- Prof Willie Esterhuyse, Department of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch.
- Prof Marinus Wiechers, Department of Constitutional Law, UNISA. Involved in drafting Namibian Constitution.

International Participants included:

- Mr Donald Anderson MP, British Labour MP Opposition front bench spokesman on Sooth Africa.
- Prof Dr W A G Blonk, Head of Division for Southern Africa, Directorate-General for Development, European Commission.
- Mr Elmar Brok, MEP (Germany). Member of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Christian Democratic Union of W Germany.
- Sir Fred Catherwood, MEP (UK). Vice President of the European Parliament
- Prof Kenneth Davey, Professor of Development Administration, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham. Adviser on local government Management and finance for the World Bank and other aid agencies
- Mr Silas Ita, Managing Director, Investment Promotion Centre, Nairobi.
- Mr Walter Kansteiner, Member (Africa), Secretary of State Policy Planning Council, US State Department.
- Dr Tony Lemon, Lecturer in Geography and Fellow of Mansfield College, University of Oxford,
- Prof David K Leonard, Professor of Public Administration, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
- Prof Ben O Nwabaeze. Expert on Constitutional Law in sub-Saharan Africa. Member of the constitutional drafting committees for Zambia (1973) and Nigeria (1976). Author of several books on constitutionalism in Africa.
- Mr Joshua Nyoni, Agency for Development Co-operation, NORAD, Zimbabwe, formerly Chief Planning Officer with the Ministry of Agriculture and Resettlement, Zimbabwe.
- Mr Fred Ojiambo, Chairman of Kenya Law Society.
- Mr G O Onosode, Financial and Public Affairs Consultant, Lagos. Doctor of Science (Honoris Lawsa) Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-ife. Chairman of (inter alia) Cadbury Nigeria Ltd.
- Dr L Sondashi, Member of Central Committee of the United National Independence Party, Zambia.
- Mr Leen van der Waal, MEP (Netherlands) representing the Christian parties in the Netherlands.

B. Newick Park Conference at Highmoor Hall, 1-3 Feb, 1990: 'Constitutional safeguards in federal and unitary states' – Agreed Statement

As Christians, the following points of agreement emerged from our study of the papers attached:

1. We recognize that human rights must be constitutionally protected and in formulating a catalogue of these rights, we believe it is important to maintain a balance with human duties and obligations.

2. In interpretation of human rights, we believe it is important to keep in mind the interaction of individual and family rights to ensure that individual rights are not used to undermine the God-given institution of the family.

3 [5] We strongly endorse the multi-party system for the future of South Africa and would like to see further research into the structural conditions which are necessary to sustain a multi-party system based on experience in other countries.

4 [6] Apart from unitarism, we recognise that federalism is an option with potential advantages in terms of economic growth and constitutional safeguards, but realise that it cannot be imposed from on-top but can only develop from the grass roots.

5 [3] We believe it is important to ensure not just that individuals are free but that the institutions in which they express their humanity are free, in particular the church, the judiciary, the media, local government and the professions

6 [4] We recognise that a wide range of cultural and religious safeguards is possible, from the personal and informal through to major issues requiring constitutional provision, and we believe this spectrum should be examined to see where the line should be drawn.

7. We recognize that the only basis on which all the people of South Africa will feel secure under a new constitution will be through the development of common values and mutual trust.

C. Political and Economic Implications of Unitary and Federal Systems of Government Within A Democratic Framework, 26-29 June 1990

As an informal group of Christians drawn from both the international community with relevant political, academic and diplomatic experience and a wide spectrum of political opinion in South Africa, those of us present at the NPI meeting in June 1990 would like to express our agreement with the following principles which emerged from our study of papers presented at this conference:

1.   The basis of democracy is the belief in the dignity of man as made in the image of God. This means that everyone should have the right to participate in government, and there should be equality before the law; there should be one person, one vote.

2.   Political leaders should be under the law, not above it. They should live by Christian principles of justice and righteousness, and give priority to the protection of the poor and vulnerable. They are servants of, and accountable to, God and the people.

3.   There needs to be a consensus of values for a just and stable political order including tolerance, self-restraint and discipline in the way the political system operates so that in the context of specific issues the minorities will accept the decision of the majority, and the majority will accept the need for consultation and conciliation with the minority. This is the oxygen of democracy.

4.   The sinfulness of humanity needs to be recognised which makes it necessary to limit concentration of political power in the hands of one person. This also includes the principle of subsidiarity whereby power is diffused and brought closer to the people.

5.   It is important to combine effective central government with a constitutional guarantee of the existence, function and funding of local government.

6.   To give effect to the principle of accountability to the people, the ideal is a multi-party system within limits set by the constitution.

Two participants wished to state this point differently in the following terms:
The basis of democracy is the belief in the dignity of each person as made in the image of God. This means that every person should have the right to vote and should have the right to participate in government.'

D. Statement of Conclusions from Land Conference 9-12 October 1990

As an informal group of Christians drawn from the international community with relevant political, academic and diplomatic experience and a wide spectrum of political opinion in South Africa, those of us present at the NPI meeting in October 1990 would like to affirm our commitment to build a new South Africa and to express our agreement with the following statement, which emerged from our study of papers presented at this conference:

1. Background

The legacy of apartheid is that of a grossly unequal distribution of land, based on racial discrimination.

The white minority owns, and thus controls, access to the use and benefits of the greater part of the total land of South Africa largely through various forms of dispossession of the black majority.

The land question has always been central to the struggle for liberation in South Africa and no settlement can be reached without addressing this historical injustice.

The resolution of the complex land question should be considered within the comprehensive framework of priorities required for the birth of a new and just society in South Africa.

2. Values

In recognition of the sanctity of life, the value and status of human beings, the need to work and the importance of relationships, we affirm that all people regardless of race and gender should have access to land (urban or rural) and security of tenure on that land.

The land tenure system should enhance, protect and support family and community life, and also facilitate and improve the quality of life of all people.

Land should be used productively and protected for future generations taking into account ecological aspects as well as food security in the short and long-term. Land speculation is anathema to this value.

3. Goals

The possession of a significantly increased share of high-potential agricultural land is an essential component of Black economic empowerment which in turn is essential to complement the political reality of the new South Africa.

However, changes in land distribution should not occur in such a way as to seriously jeopardise agricultural productivity and economic growth.

Ecological factors require attention, and farming methods and practices, therefore, should be compatible with international standards of environmental protection and management.

In accordance with universal human rights and norms, conditions should be improved for dispossessed and disadvantaged rural people, including farm workers, uprooted communities, and women.

A unified and simplified land control system should be instituted as soon as possible; it should respect and draw from the positive aspects of all existing forms of land tenure and take into account local attitudes and values.

4. Strategies
A comprehensive range of policies will be necessary to achieve these goals. Those to be investigated could include:

- measures to make available substantial areas of farmland, such as placing ceilings on the size of individually owned farming units, allowing government first option to acquire all land coming onto the land market in this or any other way, and levying a progressive tax on land use.
- the establishment of an appropriate body to consider the claims of all dispossessed people.
- the establishment of a representative Land reform Commission with its terms of reference as the reform of the present tenure systems, the upgrading of existing rights, the unification and simplification of registering and town planning systems and the review of related matters.
- the introduction of a legislative framework to regulate and protect all categories of occupants, including those who do not legally own the land on which they residue.
- the provision of a full range of rights for farm workers under legislation based on internationally accepted principles of labour law.
- the reorientation and extension of infrastructural and institutional support services to meet the needs of all categories of farmer, in particular incoming small-scale farmers.
- the implementation of a comprehensive affirmative action programme incorporating, amongst others, measures to improve the targeting of subsidies, and restructure and expand agricultural research extension and conservation services.
- the investigation of the position of disadvantaged sections of the rural population such as women with a view to deciding appropriate affirmative action.

Policies for rural reform should take into account and be compatible with overall economic policies, resources and constraints, bearing in mind the needs and aspirations of all the people.

Statement of Conclusions From NPI Conference, Nationalization: Implications And The Alternatives, 21-25 January 1991

As participants at the Newick Park Initiative conference on *Nationalization: Implications and the Alternatives,* in January 1991, we have been drawn from both the international community and South Africa with relevant political, professional and practical experience and a wide spectrum of political opinion. We wish to record our appreciation for the unique opportunity provided by the NPI for in-depth encounter and discussion of key economic issues which will be considered in the negotiation process. This has taken place within a Christian framework underpinned by top-level research and expertise. We wish to affirm our agreement with the following statement which emerged from our study of the papers attached.

1. Background

The legacy of apartheid is that of a grossly unequal distribution of wealth, income, education and job opportunities.

The white minority owns or controls access to almost the entire assets of the industrial and financial structure so that the vast majority of black South Africans are dispossessed and economically disempowered. Economic justice is fundamental in the struggle for liberation in South Africa and no settlement can be reached without addressing institutional injustice of the past.

In the last decade there has been a deepening crisis of severe unemployment, slow growth and high inflation which makes the elimination of disparities in standards of living very difficult.

The distortions in the economy wrought by the system of apartheid will not be righted simply by the introduction of democracy but require creative new initiatives specifically relating to economic and business structures. Nationalization and various alternatives were therefore considered during the conference.

2. Values

In recognition of the value and status of human beings and the importance of relationships, we affirm that:

> (i) all people, regardless of race and gender, should have access to gainful work through direct employment or self-supporting enterprise;

(ii) the principle of justice in economic organisation should be seen to apply in all aspects of economic life to all races, communities and regions;
(iii) in both public and private sector industrial and financial organisations, four principles are of special relevance:

- ***Family and Community needs*** should be taken into account

- ***Accountability*** should be ensured internally within the enterprise and externally with respect to wider society

- ***Involvement*** should be maximised for all those employed in the enterprise, especially through participation in decision-making at all levels

- ***Rewards*** should reflect effort, initiative and risk-taking contributed to the enterprise.

3. Goals and Objectives

Essential goals and objectives include the following:

- Sustainable economic growth and development which safeguards the environment as an essential basis for the long term welfare of all the people of South Africa.

- Equitable distribution of wealth, income and opportunity across racial, gender and community divisions and regions, including between urban and rural areas.

- Employment, housing and training opportunities for all and the eradication of poverty.

- Restructuring and development within economic organisations to make possible a greater degree of participation in the decision-making of the enterprise and to enhance the effectiveness of all personnel.

- Reducing frictions in industrial organisation and moving towards consensual and less adversarial patterns of industrial relations.

- A level playing field and just relationships between enterprises operating within specific markets and sectors.

- A society in which people have a sense of control over the economic factors which influence their daily lives so that they are able to experience a sense of economic as well as political freedom.

- Ensuring full entry of blacks into the mainstream of the economy.

4. Strategies

A comprehensive range of strategies will be necessary to achieve these goals. Action must be taken *inter alia to:*

- remove all remaining apartheid and discriminatory legislation and other unnecessary stultifying controls;

- achieve a policy balance between satisfying the needs of the domestic market while increasing international competitiveness;

- investigate further the desirability and feasibility of both deconcentration and deconglomeration;

- strengthen competition policy to preclude dominance or disproportionate influence in sectors or markets;

- restructure industrial and financial organisations to ensure worker participation in decision-making at all levels by considering measures such as board representation and employee equity participation;

- refocus the goals of the financial sector so as to mobilise funds for long term development and employment creation and to facilitate access to credit and financial services for black business and housing;

- investigate the possibilities of using alternative forms of public enterprise to ensure that the goals of development and black participation are met;

- encourage black business development, co-operatives, partnerships and entrepreneurship through policies such as greater access to equity and working capital, subcontracting provisions and differential rates of corporation tax;

- promote comprehensive affirmative action programmes enforceable by law for companies and parastatals to increase the proportion of black directors, managers and professional staff within a realistic time frame;

- provide greatly expanded opportunities for education and the acquisition of management and technical skills both in educational institutions and in the workplace.

Further research is needed into the above-listed strategies to identify potential policy options.

F. Statement of Conclusions Conference On African Participation In Public Administration And Public Sector Economic Activity 22-26 April 1991

As participants at the Newick Park Initiative Conference on African Participation in Public Administration and Public Sector Economic Activity, which took place from 22-26 April 1991 at Ashbumham Place in Sussex, England, we have been drawn from both the international community and South Africa with relevant political, professional and practical experience and from a wide spectrum of political opinion. We wish to record our appreciation for the unique opportunity provided by the NPI for in-depth encounter and discussion of key issues relating to the public sector which we believe should be considered in the negotiation process. This has been underpinned by top-level research and expertise.

1. Background
The legacy of apartheid in the public sector is a grossly inequitable system which

(i)   Still favours in many cases the white minority in the delivery of services, and

(ii) Has been based for many years on a racist ideology and has involved gender discrimination. This is illustrated by the fact that in central state departments and in the provinces only 0.5% of the 5 top income categories are filled by Africans, and in public corporations a negligible percentage of senior management posts are filled by Africans.
The fundamental restructuring of the civil service, public corporations and the parastatal sector will be necessary to redress the injustices of the past and to help to secure justice in a post-apartheid society.

2. Values
In recognition of the value and status of human beings and the duty of government to treat all its citizens equally, we affirm that

(i)   Public appointments should follow the principles of non-racialism and personal competence and should reflect the composition of the population.

(ii)   Public servants should be held accountable for their actions by society at large.

(iii)   An ethos of service towards the public should be fostered, based on the principles of justice, honesty, responsibility, integrity and respect.

(iv)   A professional public service should be promoted to implement government policies of reconstruction, reconciliation and upliftment in the new social order and to carry the spirit of change to every citizen of the country.

(v)   The public service should be structured to increase the communities' involvement in the matters which affect their lives.

(vi)   The public service should be orientated towards development objectives and the basic needs of the population.

3. Goals and Objectives

Essential goals and objectives include the following:

(i)   The achievement within a realistic time frame of a civil service reflecting the composition of the population.

(ii)   The development of a high standard of competence and efficiency in the delivery of services to all sections of society, taking into account the particular needs of urban and rural areas.

(iii)   The creation of a representative Public Service Commission responsible for ensuring that, subject to the requirements of fair equality of opportunity, appointments are made on the grounds of merit.

4. Follow-up Actions

(i)   In order to achieve overall public sector restructuring, a political settlement must be achieved at the earliest possible time. Therefore every effort to accelerate the process of negotiation should be encouraged.

(ii)   Further research should be conducted urgently into the following areas:

    a. Employment and salary data for the public sector in the whole of South Africa, including breakdown in terms of race and salary for all grades for all parts of the public sector.
    b. Exploring the most effective basis for the delivery of services between the different tiers of government and how they are financed.
    c. The various alternative options for restructuring public sector organisations including a re-orientation of their objectives and the procedures for selection, recruitment and promotion of personnel.
    d. Conducting a public service training needs analysis.
    e. The comparative experience with administrative reconstruction in other countries.

(iii)   Review existing administrative approaches, practices and procedures, e.g. through seminars.

(iv)   Formulate alternative policy proposals to effect the restructuring of the public sector, including proposals to strengthen and expand institutional capacity for the provision of professional and technical expertise to the public sector.

(v)   Take immediate action to increase the number of scholarships and training opportunities in professional and technical skills in the public sector for disadvantaged communities and develop collaboration with international agencies.

(vi)   Deliberately accelerate corrective action in the employment practices of all public sector institutions in consultation with all representative groupings and relevant professional organisations.

G.   List of Research Papers 1987-1991

The following are the papers which were produced by the NPI. The major parties to the negotiation process received copies of these papers as and when they are produced.

1. Alternative constitutional settlements in South Africa: Christian principles and practical feasibility (Schluter and Ive, Mar 87) 66 pp.

2. Report (with summary) on the structure of the South African economy and its implications for decentralised government (Porteous, Sept 87) 77 pp.

3. Christian initiatives for South Africa's future (Ive, Nov 87) Jubilee Centre Publications: South Africa Series No 1, 10 pp.

4. The Northern Ireland experience: comparative conclusions relating to South Africa (Catherwood & Ashcroft, Oct 87) 17 pp.

5. Unitary and federal forms of transition (Ive, Oct/Nov 87; Oct 89), 13 pp.

6. Regional Services Councils: a preliminary assessment (Ashcroft/Porteous, Oct 87/Jan 88) 17 pp.

7.Land Rights and Obligations as a Moral Basis for Constitutional Settlements in South Africa (Schluter, July 87) 32 pp.

8a. Historical background to the settlement of the land (Ive, Jul 87), 3 pp.

8b. The historical and ethical background to the land question in South Africa (Ashcroft, Oct 87) 16 pp.

9. Fear as a constitutional problem in South Africa (Tema, Oct 87) 3 pp.

10. White fears (Esterhuyse, Oct 87), 4 pp.

11. Individuals and community in South Africa (Stevens, Oct 87) 3 pp.

12. The implications for future constitutional settlement in South Africa of recent and prospective developments in the structures of central government (Ive & Ashcroft, Feb 88) 15 pp.

13. A biblical critique of forms of land tenure in South Africa (Schluter, Feb 88) 18 pp.

14. Land reform in Kenya and Zimbabwe: some lessons for South Africa (Ashcroft, Feb 88) 15 pp.

15. Land reform: potential and priorities for South Africa (Porteous, July/Oct 88) 29 pp.

16. Ethnicity and nation-building: Christian norms, African experience and possible action programme for South Africa (Schluter & Ashcroft, Feb 88) 32 pp.

16b Ethnic Conflict in Africa and Strategies that have been used for dealing with it (Ashcroft, Jan 88) 12 pp.

17. Alternative strategies to overcome low income white fears of unemployment (Schluter

& Porteous, Feb 88), 19 pp.

18. The PEACE principles: biblical norms and alternative defence structures for a future constitutional settlement in South Africa (Ive & Ashcroft, May 88), 30 pp.

19. Financing and implementing land reform in Asia: some lessons for South Africa (Ashcroft, May 88), 17 pp.

20. Ownership and management of the South African economy (Porteous, May 88) 31 pp.

21. Christian FAIR business principles and the reform of South Africa's industrial structures (Schluter, May 88), 27 pp.

22. The Christian case for the diffusion of economic power (Catherwood, May 88), 8 pp.

23. Constructing a New Framework for Economic Policy: Family Priorities under Growing Pressures of Social and Economic Change (Schluter, May 88), 7 pp.

24. Confidence-building measures and the achievement of constitutional settlement in South Africa (Ive & Ong, June/Oct 88, July 89) 38 pp.

25. The transfer of business ownership and control to Africans in independent African states: a study of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Campanale, Oct 88), 63 pp. Response by Gamaliel O Onsode, Jan 91, 8 pp.

26. Christian principles for the provision of welfare (Ashcroft, Oct 88/Mar 89), 31 pp.

27. Christian principles for the educational structure (Ashcroft & Barber, Feb 89), 29 pp.

28. The Provision of Education for All: Comparative Analysis with Particular Reference to Sub Saharan Africa (Barber), 4 pp.

29. Christian principles for urban policy (Ashcroft & Schluter, June 89), 19pp.

30. Urban policy in sub-Saharan Africa: an overview and Christian assessment (Schluter and Barber, Jan. 90), 30 pp.

31. Urbanisation and Metropolisation in South Africa (Kok, Finlayson & Smit, July 89), 33 pp.

32. Urban policy options to prevent overcrowding, and the site and location of urban settlement (Lemon, July 89) 23pp.

33a. Black Housing in South Africa: The Need for Shelter (Wessels, June 89), 56 pp.]

33b. Summary of Urban Papers (Wessels, 1989)

34. On what Basis do Whites have a Legitimate Place in the New South Africa (Ovey, 1990)

35. The factual situation of education in South Africa (Auerbach, Sept 89) 35pp.

36. Educational policies for a future South Africa (Weiderman, Sept 89)

37. The FAIR business policies: ten proposals (Porteous, July 89), 39pp.

38. Economic and Social Transformation Priorities within a Christian Framework of

Constitutional Settlement. Nov 89, 9 pp.

39. Multipolarity and covenant: toward a biblical framework for constitutional safeguards (Logsdon, Dec 89), 19pp.

40. Constitutional safeguards for the individual (Diamini, Feb.90), 13pp.

41. Safeguards for the family: a South African perspective (Van Wyk, Feb 90), 12pp.

42. Religious and cultural safeguards for minorities in public international law and comparative constitutional law (Cloete, Feb 90), 27pp.

43. Regional safeguards in federal states (summary) (Wiechers, Feb 90), 4pp.

44. The Covenant Principles for Democracy; Christian principles for the distribution and exercise of political power and their application in African states, and in particular, to South Africa (Ojiambo & Schluter, Jun 90), 29 pp.

45. Multi-Party Democracy in African States (Nwabueze, Jun 90), 9 pp.

46. The Relationship between Central, Regional, and Local Government in Unitary States of Sub-Saharan Africa (Davey, Jun 90), 7 pp.

47. The Unitary System of Government in South Africa; The role of central, regional and local government (Humphries, Jun 90), 7 pp.

48. Three-Tiered Federalism: Possibilities for participatory government (Buckingham, Jun 90), 19 pp.

49. South Africa: The relevance of Federalism and the Lessons of Federal Examples (Dent, Jun 90), 22 pp.

50. Unitary and Federal Systems: Implications for the economic role of government (Wilkins & Maasdorp, Jun 90), 9 pp.

51. Christian Principles for the Ownership and Distribution of Land (Schluter & Ashcroft, with response by du Toit, Oct 90), 20 pp.

52. Land Reform: Potential and Priorities for South Africa (Porteous, Aug 90), 41 pp.

53. The Political Economy of Post-1960 Dispossession in South Africa (Mbongwa, Oct 90), 23 pp.

54. An overview of current forms of Black Land Tenure (Olivier, Oct 90), 20 pp.

55. International Experience in the Implementation of Land Reform (S. Cross, Oct 90).

56. Land Reform: A User's Guide (Based on Latin American Experience). (Lehmann, Oct 90), 9 pp.

57. The Zimbabwean Experience and Lessons for South Africa (Nyoni, Oct 90), 17 pp.

58. Opening Access: An Assessment of Market-Based Options for Land Reform in South Africa (M. de Klerk, 39 pp, with response by Skweyiya, 6 pp, Oct 90).

59. The Potential to Increase Black Smallholder Production in South Africa Inside and

Outside the Homelands: Two Perspectives. (Christodoulou, 44 pp; Abrahamse, 9 pp, Oct 90).

60. The European Community's Experience in Smallholder Support Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Blonk, Oct 90), 9 pp.

61. Legal Alternatives to Communal and Individual Ownership (Latsky, 52 pp.; with responses by Diamini, 13 pp; and C. Cross, 12 pp, Oct 90).

62. Ownership and management in the South African Economy (Porteous, Jan 91), 68 pp.

63. Centralization and Concentration in the South African Economy (Professor Gavin Maasdorp, Jan 91), 20 pp. Response by Eugene Nyati, 10 pp.

64. Government Regulation of Large Business Enterprise (Dr V Dlova, Jan 91), 17 pp.

65. Structural Options for Matching Rights and Obligations in the Public Company (Professor Anthony Asher, Jan 91), 12 pp. Response by Professor Sam Zondi, 5 pp.

66. Mutual Involvement and Ownership, Organisation and Management of the South African Gold Mining Industry (Dr Michael Hodson, Jan 91), 38 pp. Response by Martin Nicol, 6 pp.

67a. Pre-conditions, objectives and mechanisms for introducing Employee Ownership in South Africa (Mr Robert Oakeshott, Jan 91), 7 pp. Response (Jennifer Kinghorn and Ellen Mosala, Jan. 91).

68. The Industrial Sector, Economic Development and Nationalization (McCarthy, Jan 91), 13 pp.

69. American Experience with Structural Changes by Anti-Trust Actions (Professor William G Shepherd, Jan 91), 28 pp.

70. Lessons from Demerger Experience in Europe (Dr Matthew Bishop, Jan 91).

71. Heart Attack? Bank Nationalization in South Africa: Implications and Alternatives (Mr David Porteous, Jan 91), 92 pp. Response by H P de Villiers, 7 pp.

72. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Competition Policy in South Africa (Dr Pier re Brooks, Jan 91), 8 pp.

73. Education and Training Schemes for African Entrepreneurship in South Africa (Mr Mashudu Ramano, Jan 91), 23 pp.

74. African Small Business Development: Access to Capital and Subcontracting as a Solution to the Problem (Mr Batsile S Molebatsi, Jan 91), 11 pp.

75. Christian FAIR Business Principles and Reform of South Africa's Business Structures (Schluter, Jan 91), 30 pp. (Updated version of paper no. 21).
75b Nationalisation Alternatives: Re-thinking Ownership and Control of the Firm (Frederick C V N Fourie, Jan 91)

76. An overview of the Role of the Public Sector in the South African Economy (Prof Elwil Beukes, Apr 91), 27 pp.

77. Employment in the Public Sector of South Africa (Dr Sunette van der Walt, Apr 91), 30 pp.

78. Africanization Experience in Zimbabwe (Reverend Griffiths Malaba, Apr 91), 8 pp.

79. Issues of and Problems in Public Sector Management in Sub-Saharan Africa (Professor David K Leonard, Apr 91), 12 pp.

80. Privatization and the Restructuring of Parastatals in South Africa (Professor Stef Coetzee, Apr 91), 12 pp.

81. Christian Principles for Public Administration (Michael Schluter and Alixe Buckerfield de la Roche, Apr 91), 20 pp. Responses by Professor Itumeleng Mosala, 6 pp, and Professor Danie du Toit, 5 pp.

82. Systems of Government Structure (Professor Robert Schrire, Apr 91), 9 pp. Responses by Dr A M Ndlovu, 7 pp and Mr Enos Ngutshane, 3 pp.

83. The Financial Implications of the Alternative Structural Possibilities for Public Sector Reform (Mr Gerhard P Croeser, Apr 91), 17 pp.84. Whites in the South African Civil Service: "Angst" and the Future (Professor Pierre Hugo, Apr 91), 17 pp.

85. The Motivation of Subordinates in the Public Service (Professor Arnold Mol, Apr 91), 5 pp. Response by Professor Sam Zondi, 5 pp.

86. Local Government Training Initiatives in South Africa (Dr Chris Thomhill, Apr 91), 15 pp.

87. Public Service in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Mr Mzwai Piliso, Apr 91), 3 pp.

88. An Analysis of the Current Availability of African Trained Manpower in the Public Sector (Mr Papie Moloto, Apr 91), 5 pp.

89. Training Facilities for Public Sector Human Resources in South Africa. Potential and Prospects for Expansion (Professor Erwin Schwella, Apr 91), 2 pp. Response (Dr Seshi Chonco), 2 pp.

90. Transition and Affirmative Action: The Public Service (Dr Vincent Maphai, Apr 91), 15 pp.

91. An Overview of the Role of the Public Sector in South Africa – Past and Future (Professor Sample Terreblanche, Apr 91), 48 pp.